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E-mail: silvajp@amu.edu.pl

Poznań-Warszawa, czerwiec 2006

Dear Readers,

It is our pleasure to deliver the summer fascicle of *Silva Iaponicarum* 日林, the first to appear under the auspices of our research council. The fascicle contains articles from the fields of political science, economy and linguistics.

We would like to thank the council members for the cooperation. We hope that with our research council *Silva* will become more attractive, both for our readers and contributors.

The September fascicle will appear soon.

The editorial board

E-mail: silvajp@amu.edu.pl

Poznań- Warsaw, June 2006

読者のみなさまへ

Silva Iaponicarum 日林夏号をお届けします。経済学、言語学の論文を掲載する今号は、*Silva* 研究顧問委員会の認可を受けた第一号です。

研究顧問委員会メンバーの方々のご協力に、心より感謝いたします。それによって *Silva* が読者のみなさまにとってもご投稿されるみなさまにとってもより魅力のある季刊誌となるよう、希望します。

9月号はまもなく刊行されます。

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E-mail: silvajp@amu.edu.pl

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Instytut Orientalistyczny, Zakład Japonistyki

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Silva Iaponicarum
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza
Instytut Orientalistyczny
ul. Międzychodzka 5
60-371 Poznań, Poland

E-mail: silvajp@amu.edu.pl

www.silvajp.amu.edu.pl

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Beata Bochorodycz

Policy Initiatives in Japanese Local Administration: Initiation of the Okinawa Prefecture's Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept

The Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept (CCFC; *Kokusai toshi keisei kōsō* 「国際都市形成構想」) was a set of long-term socio-economic policies¹ that the local government of the Okinawa prefecture created for the first time entirely on its own initiative and submitted to the central government between January 1996 and November 1997.

The CCFC, invoking the fundamental principles of *jiritsu* (自立 autonomy, independence, self-standing), peace and coexistence, envisioned future development on the assumption of total return of the U.S. military bases, covering approximately 20% of the main island. The plan set up the goals of creating a self-standing prefectural economy, contribution to peace and sustainable development in the Asian Pacific region, and international

¹ The CCFC, following the usage by the prefectural administrative organs, designates the entire set of policies formulated under the Ōta administration, while the most general plan among them, which in Japanese carries the name CCFC (*Kokusai toshi keisei kōsō* – 21 seiki ni muketa Okinawa no gurando dezain 「国際都市形成構想—21世紀に向けた沖縄のグランドデザイン」 [Cosmopolitan city formation concept: Grand design of Okinawa toward 21st century]), is referred to in this research as the CCFC Main Text to avoid confusion. Besides the (1) CCFC Main Text, the CCFC consisted of: (2) Base Return Action Program (BRAP; *Kichi henkan akushon puroguramu* 「基地返還アクションプログラム」); (3) Request for Deregulation and Other Industrial Promotion Special Measures (*Kisei kanwa nado sangyō shinkō sochi ni kansuru yōbō* 「規制緩和等産業振興措置に関する要望」; hereafter cited as Deregulation Request); (4) New Industrial Promotion Policy for Cosmopolitan City Formation: Based on the “Report by the Committee of Industrial and Economic Promotion and Deregulation Study” (Prefectural Final Free Trade Zone [FTZ] Plan; hereafter cited as Prefectural Final FTZ Plan; *Kokusai toshi keisei ni muketa aratana sangyō shinkōsaku: Sangyō, keizai no shinkō to kisei kanwa nado kentō iinkai hōkoku o ukete (Jiyū bōeki kōsō [FTZ] Ken saishūan)* 「国際都市形成に向けた新たな産業振興策—産業・経済の振興と規制緩和等検討委員会報告を受けて(自由貿易構想[FTZ]県最終案)」); (5) the Cosmopolitan City Formation Basic Plan: Towards Realization of the “21 Century Grand Design” (*Kokusai toshi keisei kihon keikaku: “21 seiki Okinawa grando dezain” no jitsugen ni mukete* 「国際都市形成基本計画—『21世紀沖縄のグランドデザイン』の実現に向けて」; hereafter cited as Basic Plan); and (6) Towards Realization of the Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept (*Kokusai toshi kōsō keisei jitsugen ni mukete* 「国際都市構想形成実現に向けて」).

exchange by making most of Okinawa's history, its cultural heritage and natural environment. Such objectives generally ran along the lines of earlier promotion and development plans and comprehensive national policies. The means of their achievement however, namely, the introduction of deregulation measures on a scale of "one country, two systems," including the proposal for the prefecture-wide FTZ – challenged the existing state apparatus. The plan led to unprecedented discussions, conflicts and negotiations both between the central and local governments, and within these two political entities.²

Why and how did the prefectural government come up with the policy? Why did it "disregard" the existing system for local policy making? How did the local government pursue the policy vis-à-vis the central government? This research seeks answers to these questions. It attempts, in other words, to illuminate the conditions that enabled formation of an independent local policy making (CCFC), and factors accounting for setting the first part of the CCFC, the Base Return Action Program on the national government's decision agenda.³

The CCFC presents a model case of an independent local policy making – that is formation of a policy concerning local community *by* the local government (prefectures; cities, towns and villages, hereafter cited as municipalities) on its own initiative. Using the multiply streams model advocated by John Kingdon (1995) and others (Zahariadis 1999: 73-93), I argue that the CCFC was brought about by a consecutive coupling of three streams of politics, problems and policy, first on the local level, and then on the national level. In the first instance it was: (1-loc.) the politics stream, which included the ideology of local executive leaders; (2-loc.) the problems stream, which involved the need of returns of the U.S. military land for prefecture's economic development; and (3-loc.) the policy stream, which included proposals generated on local initiative by the new progressive administration.

In the second instance of streams' coupling on national level, which resulted in setting the local initiative on the central government's decision agenda, it was: (1-nat.) the politics stream, which involved public mood

² For the CCFC's content description see: Ōshiro (1997: 139-151); Sakaguchi (1997: 151-168); Shiroi (1997: 169-202); For the economic analysis of the CCFC see: Shinjō (1998: 359-385); Makino (1997, 197-283); Miyagi (1998: 30-34).

³ The decision agenda is a list of items the government is planning to execute. Kingdon differentiates it from the public agenda, which consists of items that are of concern to wider public, and formal agenda that is items that the government is paying attention to. Kingdon (1995: 3-4).

shaped by the reporting on the rape of a schoolgirl by the U.S. service members stationed in Okinawa, and the ideology of the ruling party, the SDP which led the coalition government at that time; (2-nat.) the problems stream, which involved refusal of the proxy for military land lease by Governor Ōta; and (3-nat.) the policy stream, which consisted of proposals formulated by the prefecture under the CCFC framework. In addition the local policy initiatives were supported on the national level by a policy entrepreneur⁴ in person of Prime Minister Murayama. Such double coupling of streams or opening of policy windows⁵ on both local and national levels was necessary because of the centralized system of local policy making, under which the execution of the purely locally-initiated policies depend on financial, legal and administrative support of the central government.⁶

The analysis demonstrated in sum that the conditions enabling purely locally-initiated policy on the local level and its further setting on the national decision agenda include: (1) a double coupling of streams of politics, problems and policy on both the local and national levels; (2) possession of a bargaining card by the local government which can be used vis-à-vis the central government to induce response to local demands; and (3) simultaneous interplay of all three factors in the streams of politics, problems and policy, attended in addition by political entrepreneurs both local and national respectively willing to push with a policy initiative.

The analysis focuses here on the first phase of the CCFC policy formation, the period between inauguration of Governor Ōta in November 1990 and the submission of the first part of the CCFC – the Base Return Action Program (BRAP) to the central government on 30 January 1996. During that period the political landscape on the national level also underwent significant transformation. Not only the cabinets changed five times during that time, but also the first after thirty eight years, the non-LDP cabinet of Hosokawa Morihiro was formed in 1993. It gave a rise to coalition governments, first, the non-LDP, and since July 1994, again the LDP-centered. In result, with the exception of the Communist Party (Nihon

⁴ Policy entrepreneurs are advocates of certain policies who are “willing to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, money – to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits” (ibid., 179). For various concepts of a policy entrepreneur, see ibid., 122, note 3.

⁵ A policy window (window of opportunity) is a temporal stimulus for choice or an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to draw attention to their special problems. Ibid., 154.

⁶ See, for example, Muramatsu (1997); Abe et al. (1994: 171-187).

Kyōsantō 日本共産党), all the opposition parties participated in consecutive governments. Among those coalitions, the biggest surprise was the coalition of the long-standing opponents, the LDP and the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ)⁷ joined in addition by the New Party Sakigake (Shintō Sakigake 新党さきがけ) and led by the SDPJ leader Murayama Tomiichi 村山富市 (July 1994 - Jan. 1996). It was during the Murayama premiership that the negotiations on the locally-initiated policies between the central and Okinawan governments began.

Politics and Problems: The Change of Prefectural Administration

On the local level, the policy window opened when Ōta Masahide 大田昌秀 (b. 1925), a retired professor from Ryūkyū University backed up by a progressive block (*kakushin jin'ei* 革新陣営)⁸ won the gubernatorial election on 15 November 1990. Ōta defeated the incumbent conservative governor Nishime Junji 西銘順治, who had been in office for twelve consecutive years (1978-1990), and who represented a model type of a politician with strong ties to the central government, the so called “pipe” indispensable for channeling the central financial resources.

The change of prefectural administration in the stream of politics was followed by a redefinition of local problems along the lines of political ideology of the new governor and his supporting camp. Ōta named the U.S. military bases as the most serious problem confronting local community, called for their removal, and promised “creation of Okinawa prefecture of Peace” (*heiwa no Okinawa ken zukuri* 平和の沖縄県づくり). The new governor repeated his vow in the first policy speech delivered in the

⁷ Japan Socialist Party (JSP) or Nihon Shakaitō 日本社会党 changed its English name to Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) in 1991, but the Japanese name remained unchanged till January 1996, when it became Shakai Minshutō 社会民主党, or Shamintō 社民党 as it is popularly known, Social Democratic Party. In this study, JSP refers to postwar period until 1991, SDPJ to 1992–1995, and SDP to the period since 1996.

⁸ Ōta was supported by: the SDPJ/SDP; a local party of the Okinawa Social Masses Party (Okinawa Shakai Taishūtō 沖縄社会大衆党, known as Shataitō 社大党); Japan Communist Party; Okinawa Japan’s Teachers Union (Okinawa Kyōshokuin Kumiai 沖縄教職員組合 or Okikyōso 沖教組), High School Teachers Union (Kōtō Gakkō Kyōshokuin Kumiai 高等学校教職員組合 or Kōkyōso 高教組), All Japan Local Government Workers Labor Union (Jichirō 自治労), Okinawa Citizens Association (Kenmin no Kai 県民の会), and other.

prefectural assembly in December 1990,⁹ half a year later, on 23 June 1991,¹⁰ announced the Peace Declaration (Ōta 1991: 163-164) at the Okinawa war memorial service, and soon after that (19 July-4 Aug. 1991) went to the United States to petition the American government for the base closures. Ōta thereby established himself as the “peace and antiwar” governor.

Such strong antiwar and anti-base feelings of the governor were shaped by his youthful experience in the Okinawa battle (April-June 1945),¹¹ the only direct ground fighting on the Japanese soil between the imperial and American forces during the Pacific War that annihilated one third (120,000-150,000) of local civilian population.¹² Ōta repeatedly made references to his experiences and insisted that the only way to secure peace on the islands that are overly burden with the military bases – was their removal. The governor’s claims were met by a receptive audience, whose expectations for the base closures were high at the advent of the 1990s. The Cold War had just ended and the U.S. government announced its plans to restructure the American military forces both at home and overseas.¹³ The second problem that Ōta pledged to resolve were the economic issues and formation of the Third Okinawa Promotion and Development Plan

⁹ Governor Ōta’s speech in the prefectural assembly on 17 December 1990. Ōta (1991: 136-137).

¹⁰ 23 June – *Irei no hi* 慰霊の日, or the All Fallen in the Battle of Okinawa Memorial Day – is a prefectural public holiday enacted by the prefectural assembly to commemorate the battle of Okinawa (1945) that ended on that day.

¹¹ The bombing of the islands started on 23 March 1945, followed by the U.S. landing on the Kerama islands on 26 March, and on 1 April on the main island.

¹² For description of Ōta’s war experience and a detailed account of the Okinawa battle, see Ōta (1996).

¹³ Already in 1988 the U.S. Congress pressed by a stagnant economy and growing urgency to reduce the federal budget deficit authorized (Public Law 100-526) establishment of a special independent Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC), which submitted its recommendations in December 1988. In November 1990, President George Bush signed Public Law 101-510 that created another independent, five-year Defense Bases Realignment and Closure Commissions (also known as BRAC although the letters do not line up), with closures rounds in 1991, 1993, and 1995. In result, between 1989 and 1999 the total U.S. military personnel fell by 34.95% from 2,130,000 to 1,384,700, of which the overseas forces were reduced most by 51.57% from 510,000 to 247,000 (Department of Defense 2000: C-2). It is not clear how many of the overseas installations were closed in the same period, but for the domestic installations the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that in result of BRAC recommendations the U.S. Department of Defense reduced its domestic infrastructure by approximately 20% in years 1989-1997, closing 97 out of 495 major U.S. installations. United States General Accounting Office (2001: 2-4).

(OPDP; *Okinawa shinkō kaihatsu keikaku* 「沖縄振興開発計画」 1992-2001).¹⁴ The latter was of special importance to the prefecture because it sets the general administrative and budgetary framework for all the other socio-economic policies, and thereby affects the state of local economy (*Okinawa Times*, 18 Nov. 1990). The OPDPs, although formally to be initiated by the prefectural government,¹⁵ were in practice formulated by the central bureaucracy, while the role of the prefecture was reduced mostly to petitioning (Fumoto 12 Feb. 2004).¹⁶ Ōta, who took over the office in the beginning of December 1990, already in April 1991 cast his doubts.

I cannot avoid thinking that our almost daily trips to Tokyo to petition the central government are not going to create a bright future for Okinawa, but on the contrary, will create Okinawa that cannot stand on its own (*jiritsu*). I feel like my feet are getting heavier and heavier every time I depart on a trip to Tokyo. Ōta (1991: 75).¹⁷

Ōta's electoral vows followed in fact the pattern of all the previous (and consecutive) gubernatorial elections: the progressives calling for military base withdrawal as their main pledge, and the conservatives – for tackling economic issues and improving relations with the central government in order to obtain financial assistance.¹⁸ The main axis has run, in other words, between “the bases” and “the economy,” although it has to be noted that for any local politician, including members of the Okinawa branch of the conservative LDP, not to pledge resolution to the base problem as such would be politically suicidal. For the prefecture hosted approximately 75% of all U.S. military facilities located in Japan (while comprising only 0.6%

¹⁴ Governor Ōta and his staff expected the Third OPDP to become the last of such special plans. Fumoto (29 January 2004).

¹⁵ Okinawa Special Measures Law, art. 4.

¹⁶ Tawata (2003: 101), a veteran journalist of the *Okinawa Times*, pejoratively calls such system of policy making the “begging and petitioning” (*monogoi, chinjōshugi* 物乞い、陳情主義), which essentially points to the centralized structures of policy making for Okinawa.

¹⁷ This and all following translations from Japanese by the author.

¹⁸ The nine gubernatorial elections between 1972, the year of Okinawa's reversion, and 2002 have been won five times by two conservative candidates: Nishime Junji in 1978, 1982 and 1984, and Inamine Keiichi 稲嶺恵一 in 1998 and 2002; and four times by three progressive candidates: Yara Chōbyō 屋良朝苗 in 1972, Taira Kōichi 平良幸市 in 1976 (who resigned in the midterm due to health problems), and Ōta Masahide in 1990 and 1994. *Okinawa Times*, 3 November 2002.

of total national land), which occupied 10.8% of the entire prefectural area, and 19.5% of the most populated main island, in addition to 20 sectors of air space and 29 zones in the sea.¹⁹ Moreover, the military facilities accommodated 27,121 U.S. army service members (including 16,200 marines) and 23,757 of their families, who between 1972 and 1995 committed 4,784 crimes and caused numerous accidents.²⁰ For that reason, even the candidates of the conservative block have been promising resolution to the base problem, although without advocating it as the focal issue or tightening the base closures to any rigid timetables.²¹

The reverse has been also true for the progressive candidates pledging resolution to the economic problems and engagement in the OPDPs formation as the second main issue. Okinawa still had the lowest in Japan per capita income (71.9% of national average); highest unemployment rate (3.9% vs. 2.1% national average in 1990, which by 1998 jumped to 7.7% vs. 4.1%) and of much higher among the younger generation: 20.0% (15 - 19 years old), and 8.9% (20-24 years old); a very weak secondary industry that represented the lowest share in the production output (21.4% vs. 38.3%); and the lowest in the country own financial resources as of the expenditures (23.5% vs. 55.8%).²²

Hence the pledges and the problems were not new, but what Governor Ōta did differently, was to entirely shift the emphasis on the military bases on one hand, point to them as the fundamental hindrance to local economic development and self-standing (*jiritsu*), and thereby the welfare of local citizens, and propose a grand plan for Okinawa on the assumption of total base removal (*Okinawa Times*, 18 Nov. 1990). The governor set forth the argument that the improvement of the economic situation depended on industrial promotion that again was related to betterment and expansion of transportation network, land procurement for industrial use, access to water supplies (many located on the military land), systematic urban development and other. All that was hampered by the concentration of the

¹⁹ Among 53 municipalities 23 host the U.S. military bases, which in four municipalities cover over 50% of the total area: 82% of the Kadena town, and 59% of the Yomitan, 56% of the Chatan and 51% of Ginoza villages. Okinawa Ken (1996a: 9).

²⁰ Data for 1995, which has not substantially changed through the 1990s. *Ibid.*, 1-3, 104. The 4,784 crimes committed by U.S. army and their families constitutes only 0.5% of all the crimes committed in Okinawa in 1995 (the average between 1972 and 1995 was 1.9%), nevertheless politically the number arises much controversy and criticism.

²¹ On the progressives and conservatives see, for example, Egami (1994: 168-143).

²² All economic data is for 1990, with the exception of the secondary industry output, which is for 1992. Okinawa Kaihatsu Chō Okinawa Sōgō Jimu Kyoku (1995: 14, 7, 7, 15, 72).

military facilities in the most densely populated areas of the southern (1,468 person/km²) and central (1,779 person/km²) parts of the main island.²³ This important theme, to which I will return later in this article, became most forcefully put forward during negotiations with the central government in 1996. In the beginning of the second year in office, in January 1992, the governor declared his intention of a new policy formation still in abstract, although powerful terms.

We have to cut open a new way to *jiritsu* [emphasis mine]. Right now is the time to restore our enterprising spirit and our determination to make living on our own. I strongly believe that for that purpose we have to revolutionize our way of thinking. And from that standpoint, solving the base problem of our prefecture cannot be avoided.

I have been entrusted by 1.2 million citizens and assigned the role of the “chief designer” of prefectural administration. Therefore, I would like to freely design several policies to realize the dreams of our citizens. Unfortunately the canvas we are facing is not white. Several difficult problems, such as the existence of military bases ... and other remain and pollute it. Hence, although the solution of those problems will be extremely difficult, by any means, I want to work to gather the wisdom and energy of our citizens, repaint the canvas into snow-white, and together with all of you, venture to freely envision our happy dreams for the 21st century. Ōta (1992: 149).

The speech, which left a deep impression on the prefectural office staff, was in fact written by the governor’s Policy Coordination Counselor Yoshimoto Masanori 吉元政矩 (b. 1936). Yoshimoto, an experienced activist from the powerful All Japan Local Government Workers Labor Union (Jichirō), was in October 1993 nominated the vice governor, and consecutively became the mastermind of all Ōta’s policies (Yoshimoto 2001). Yoshimoto, like other local citizens who still remembered the Okinawa Battle, twenty seven years of American occupation (1945-1972) and disappointment at the reversion not accompanied by substantial base closures, shared the governor’s anti-war and anti-base stance. But in addition, Yoshimoto also cherished the idea of “self-governed” Okinawa that was to go back to its roots, when as an independent kingdom of Ryūkyū (XIV-XIX)²⁴ prospered of trade and commerce with neighboring

²³ Data for 1990. Ibid.: 1.

²⁴ The Ryūkyū Kingdom was invaded by the Satsuma army already in 1609, but it

regions and countries.²⁵ Both ideas of peace (antiwar and anti-base) and *jiritsu* found their full expression in the prefectural new grand vision.

Policy Stream: The UERI Report

The two executive leaders, having redefined local problems of the military bases and economy along their ideological lines, having attached them to particular solution of a need for a new policy, and having placed them on the prefectural decision agenda – set on preparing the policy alternatives. In the generation of the policy proposals, which took place between 1992 and 1995 and which for technical and political reasons was entrusted to a Tokyo-based think tank, the precedence and centrally designed policy framework, as argued in this section, were to play important roles.

Declaration of a new policy by local executives was one thing, but actual formation was a different matter that required knowledge, expertise, skills, information, and more, for which most local governments in Japan were not prepared. Okinawa was actually in a special position in comparison to all the other prefectures (with the exception of Hokkaidō) because its policies fell under the competence of the Okinawa Development Agency (ODA; Okinawa Kaihatsu Chō 沖縄開発庁).²⁶ The agency was specifically established for Okinawa to help redress economic gap with the mainland Japan caused by the prolonged American occupation and to establish a self-standing local economy. The ODA, based on the Special Measures Law for Okinawa Promotion and Development (*Okinawa shinkō kaihatsu tokubetsu sochi hō* 沖縄振興開発特別措置法; hereafter cited as Okinawa Special Measures Law; passed on 31 December 1971), formulated three ten-year plans, the First (1972-1981), Second (1982-1991) and Third (1992-2001) Okinawa Promotion and Development

maintained feudal relations both with the Chinese emperor and Satsuma lords till its incorporation into Japan as a prefecture in 1879.

²⁵ The idea took shape, as recalled by Yoshimoto, during his formative years spent on Japan's peripheries, the western-most island of Yonaguni located in close proximity to Taipei (115 km, and 516 km to Naha) where he was born, and occupied at that time by Japan's Taiwan where he attended elementary school, as well as thorough studies of Okinawan history. Yoshimoto (2001). See also Tawata (2003: 91).

²⁶ With the administrative reform in 2001, the ODA was incorporated into the Cabinet Office under Okinawa Bureau and Okinawa Promotion Bureau, headed by a state minister for Special Missions for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs.

Plans,²⁷ which under the supervision of the central ministries contributed predominantly to improvement of the prefectural infrastructure.²⁸

The Economic Research Institute (UERI)

The local leaders were however in search of a different type of policy than the earlier development plans supervised by the ODA. Vice Governor Yoshimoto requested the prefectural Planning and Development Department (Kikaku Kaihatsu Bu 企画開発部) to look for a think tank that would fulfill two requirements; first, be progressive enough to formulate a bold and unorthodox policy, and second, be conservative enough to have strong connections with the central government bureaucrats and politicians, academics, researchers, influential business and finance people (Yoshimoto 2001). After the search, the prefectural department suggested the Tokyo-based Urban Economic Research Institute (UERI),²⁹ which the vice governor requested for a policy formation in the beginning of 1992. Yoshimoto explained to the UERI that he expected a plan that “would propose ‘a new and original vision for Okinawa’s future.’ A grand plan that would take into account existing examples from abroad, such as the system of city state of Singapore, the functional division between Hawaii and the mainland U.S., and the special self-government system of Puerto Rico” (Kōzuma 2001: 75). The vice governor was particularly interested in the functioning of the systems that supported trade and commerce in Singapore, tourism industry in Hawaii and political autonomy of Puerto Rico, hoping that they could become models to follow for Okinawa (Yoshimoto 1995: 3).

Yoshimoto also suggested UERI to invite several prominent figures to discussions on the plan proposals in the Discussion Groups for the Cosmopolitan City OKINAWA Formation (Kokusai Toshi OKINAWA

²⁷ The name of the fourth plan formed in 2002 has been altered to the Okinawa Promotion Plan (OPP; *Okinawa shinkō keikaku* 「沖縄振興計画」).

²⁸ Around 80-90% of the expenses of the Okinawa promotion and development programs and projects have gone for public works: roads, airports, harbors, and agriculture facilities. The implemented OPDPs brought total 7.71 trillion yen (with the supplementary budgets) between 1972 and 2002. Okinawa Ken Kikaku Kaihatsu Bu (2004: 124).

²⁹ Urban Economic Research Institute (UERI), established in May 1964, is under the auspices of Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT). The institute had in 2003 around 74 staff and was chaired by Tabata Hidenao, the president of the Metocean Environment Incorporation, a member of various governmental advisory councils in METI and the Ministry of Environment. Information on UERI available from <http://www.ueri.org/main.html>; Internet; accessed 15 February 2003.

Keisei Kondankai 国際都市 OKINAWA 形成懇談会). It was created in 1993 and joined among others by: Amamoto Toshimasa 天本俊正, a former assistant vice minister from the Construction Ministry, Kodama Masato 小玉正任, a counselor for the ODA and National Archives of Japan, Konami Hirohide 小浪博英, a director general of the Urban Development Department in the National Corporation of Regional Development, and Ōtake Kenichirō 大武健一郎, a section chief from the Finance Ministry Tax Bureau. The vice governor calculated that by such arrangements, in addition to obtaining new policy ideas, the information about the prefectural plan would spread to governmental agencies, prepare the ground, and test proposals for plausibility, or, in the terminology of John Kingdon, “soften up” the policy community.³⁰ That was indispensable, according to the local leader, if the prefecture wanted to succeed with the plan’s execution under the centralized system of local autonomy (Yoshimoto 2001).

The Urban Economic Research Institute carried discussions and research studies for the next two years and in March 1994 submitted the Report of the Cosmopolitan City Formation Preparation Plan (UERI Report), which envision future development for the central-southern part of the main island at first, and which became the main body of the future CCFC Main Text and the Basic Plan. The report, which incorporated policy proposals of the members of the Discussion Groups for the Cosmopolitan City OKINAWA Formation,³¹ emphasized the trade and commerce tradition of the prefecture (the Ryūkyū islands) and its favorable geographical location, and advocated creation of a “cosmopolitan city of Okinawa” (*kokusai toshi*

³⁰ “Softening up” is a process of getting used to new ideas and building acceptance for policy proposals among the members of policy communities (actors involved in the policy making). It involves public speeches, reports and other papers, conferences, formal and informal meetings and other. Kingdon (1995: 127-131).

³¹ The recommendations of the discussion group members constituted the general framework of the UERI Report, and in addition were also included in the Report under a separate section of the “Intabyū Chōsa Gaiyō: Yūshikisha nado ni yoru kokusai toshi OKINAWA keisei e no teigen” [Outline of the interview research: Proposals of the experts and others for the formation of international city of OKINAWA] 「インタビュー調査概要—有識者等による国際都市 OKINAWA 形成への提言」. While the main part of the UERI Report became almost verbatim incorporated later into the CCFC Main Text and Basic Plan by the prefectural office, the experts’ proposals provided ideas for the formation of the Deregulation Request. Toshi Kezai Kenkyūjo (1994: 33-53).

Okinawa 国際都市沖縄) that was to become a new exchange hub in the pan-Pacific region.

The idea of such hub was not entirely new however. In fact, all of the consecutive OPDPs, following the general policy objectives set by the national plans, proposed creation of the international exchange hub in Okinawa, and the UERI report strongly emphasized its relation to such nationally designed policy frameworks: the Third OPDP and the Fourth National Comprehensive Development Plan (*Zenkokudo sōgō kaihatsu keikaku* 「全国土総合開発計画」, known under the abbreviation Zensō 全総). under which the OPDPs fell. The report explained that the cosmopolitan city idea was to realize one of the Third OPDP's objectives of creating “the southern international exchange hub of Japan,” which was to “foster distinctive regional features,” and which followed one of the Fourth Zensō's general goals of creating “multi-polar national land structure,” and within that, of creating development hub areas (*shinkō kyoten chiiki* 振興拠点地域).³² Such references to earlier policies clearly demonstrate that any plan created by a local government in Japan has to fall within a bigger policy scheme designed by the central government, in order to obtain approval and a budget allocation for its execution. But the references also show that a policy choice is in fact “bounded by inheritance,” namely by the preceding policies (Zahariadis 1995: 49).

Within those general policy objectives, the UERI Report, following the vice governor's request, was innovative or even “radical” in two aspects. First, it designed redevelopment plans for the military land, including the Kadena Air Base (Toshi Keizai Kenkyūjo 1994: 127),³³ which was to become a prototype model of a conversion program for all the other military bases to be returned in the future. Second, it suggested, although still in abstract terms, that a special self-governing system was necessary for Okinawa, a claim justified by the trends for decentralization and administrative reforms, as well as broader context of globalization, or “internationalization” (*kokusaika* 国際化) as it has been referred to in

³² The system of the development hub areas (*shinkō kyoten chiiki* 振興拠点地域) was established by the Multi-Polar National Land Structure Formation Promotion Law (*Takyoku bunsangata kokudo keisei sokushin hō* 多極分散型国土形成促進法) passed on 14 June 1988; and aimed at dispersion of economic, administrative and cultural functions among various areas concentrated until then in the Kanto (Tokyo) area, as well as, promotion of unique characteristics of particular regions. In March 2004, there existed eight of such areas, including one in Okinawa.

³³ The total area taken by the bases in the Kadena town reaches 82.8% of the entire area. Data for 1995. Okinawa Ken Sōmu Bu Chiji Kōshitsu Kichi Taisaku Shitsu (1996: 9).

Japan. Such special system, phrased in the report as the “Okinawa province” (*Okinawadō* 沖縄道) and “Ryūkyū province” (*Ryūkyū shū* 琉球州) that was a part of a “special prefecture system” (*tokubetsu todōfuken seido* 特別都道府県制度).³⁴ was further specified in the Pacific Crossroad of Okinawa as “the Ryūkyū Islands’ Special Self-Government System” (*Ryūkyū shotō tokubetsu jichisei* 琉球諸島特別自治制) formulated in 1998.³⁵

For the “radical” measures to be executed, the plan had to be approved first by the national government and henceforth, for the next two years between beginning of 1994 and 1996, the institute and the prefectural office focused on further research studies to prepare detailed proposals to fit the CCFC into existing policy frameworks (Toshi Keizai Kenkyūjo 1996a). Moreover, in preparation for the formulation of the Fifth Zensō (tentatively called Post-Four Zensō at the time).³⁶ the prefecture in cooperation with the Policy Coordination Bureau of the National Land Agency (NLA) conducted research studies that were to raise the CCFC to the rank of a national plan by including it into the new governmental policy (Toshi Keizai Kenkyūjo 1996b; Okinawa Ken, 1996a), under the title of the Okinawa “subtropical environment exchange zone” (Kokudo Chō Keiaku Chōsei Kyoku, Okinawa Ken 1995) as a part of the general objective of creating “international contribution hubs” in Japan.

The Prefectural Office: The CCFC Promotion Group

After having completed the research studies and in preparation for formation of the official policy proposal, the prefectural government undertook activities on four different fronts. First, it began publicizing campaign in the local newspaper, the *Ryūkyū Shimpō* that ran a column on

³⁴ The system, strongly advocated by the vice governor, was tentatively called by him at that time as a designated prefecture system (*seirei ken* 政令県). Yoshimoto (1995: 3).

³⁵ The original title: *21 seiki ni muketa Okinawa seisaku teigen [Dai ichiji an], Pashifikku kurosurōdo: Okinawa* 「21世紀に向けた沖縄政策提言[第一次案]パシフィッククロスロード—沖縄」. Vice Governor Yoshimoto requested Jichirō to prepare the proposal in February 1997, which was submitted to the governor on 20 February 1998.

³⁶ The Fifth Zensō (approved on 31 March 1998) included in fact many of the requested policies, quoting almost verbatim the prefectural plans, “The Okinawa region will become a special frontier region in the 21st century and a ‘base for peaceful exchanges in the Pacific Ocean (Pacific crossroad)’ that will contribute to self-sufficient regional development, and to the development of socioeconomic culture of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region.”

the CCFC titled “Toward 21st Century: Dream Workshop for Okinawa” (「21 seiki e: Okinawa, yume kōbō 21 世紀へ—沖縄・夢工房」) throughout January 1995 in fifteen installments. Second, it established in April 1995 the Cosmopolitan City Formation Promotion Group (Kokusai Toshi Keisei Sokushin Han 国際都市形成促進班; hereafter cited as CCFC Promotion Group) in the Planning and Development Department that was to consolidate the work on the CCFC in the prefectural office, and between the prefecture and various interest groups, including municipalities. The CCFC promotion Group was also to prepare a draft, at first only for the central and southern part of the Okinawa main island,³⁷ which at that stage involved rephrasing the UERI Report into the language of administrative organs (Fumoto 20 Feb. 2004). Third, the prefecture started discussions on the proposal with the municipalities in order to receive requests and obtain their approval of the plan. At the explanation meeting held on 11 May 1995 (Fumoto 25 Feb. 2004), communities not included in the initial plan raised objections, and in consequence, it was agreed that the plan would be extended to the entire prefecture (Higa 2000). Fourth, the prefectural government renewed its efforts to push for the passage of the Special Measures Law Concerning Return of Land Used by the U.S. Military in Okinawa Prefecture (hereafter cited as Okinawa U.S. Military Land Reversion Law).³⁸ that was to enable comprehensive planning of the returned military land by securing governmental assistance and rent payments to landowners up to three years after reversion. The circumstance seemed particularly favorable, because the coalition government was led by the leader of the Social Democratic Party of Japan, Murayama Tomiichi. Although severely revised by the still powerful LDP members,³⁹ the bill was enacted in May 1995 finalizing in fact twenty six-year long prefectural efforts.⁴⁰ The bill passage was significant because it

³⁷ The plan included 24 municipalities south from the Ishikawa city, the total area 47,070 ha, population of 1.04 m (representing 85.25% of total prefectural population in 1995). Okinawa Kaihatsu Chō Okinawa Sōgō Jimu Kyoku (1995: 2).

³⁸ Original title: *Okinawa ken ni okeru chūryū gunyōchi no henkan ni tomonau tokubetsu sochi ni kansuru hōritsu* 沖縄県における駐留軍用地の返還に伴う特別措置に関する法律, popularly known as *Gunten tokusohō* 軍転特措法.

³⁹ The bill was introduced as a Diet member’s bill by Uehara Kōsuke (Okinawa district) supported by the SDPJ, the Kōmei Party (Kōmeitō 公明党), the New Party Sakigake, the Communist Party and the Reformers Club (Kaishin 改新).

⁴⁰ The request to pass the Okinawa Land Reversion Law was first made in 1978 by the then Okinawa Governor Nishime Junji, Prefectural Assembly and the Council for Military Land Conversion and the U.S. Base Problems (Okinawa Ken Gunyōchi Tenyō

created the first legal framework for military land conversions, providing localities with financial means for redevelopment on one hand, and on the other, weakening the opposition of some of the land owners and the base hosting municipalities against the base returns, who feared the instant deprivation of substantive income.

In mid of 1995, the prefecture had therefore the policy alternatives ready and was preparing to enter the final stage of policy formation and approval on the local level. It is difficult to authoritatively say what the final form of the CCFC would have taken (at this stage there was still no mention, for instance, of the prefecture wide FTZ plan), or to what extent the CCFC would have been implemented afterwards. But it is also hard to imagine that without any political pressures or a bargaining card vis-à-vis the central government, the latter would have cooperated, especially after the change from the SDP-led coalition government back to the LDP-led one in January 1996. In September 1995 however, a policy window on the national level opened, and the local leaders with a clear policy vision and policy alternatives on hand immediately recognized their chance.

Politics and Problems: The Murayama Cabinet

The policy window on the national level was opened by a rape incident that happened on 4 September 1995 in the northern part of the Okinawa main island. The consecutive developments in the streams of politics and problems demonstrated how the public mood shaped by that rape and following protests, as well as the ideology of the main ruling party (SDPJ/SDP) can affect the likelihood of setting local policy on the national decision agenda.

The Rape

The rape incident that open the policy window was not “unique” in itself because since the Okinawa reversion to Japan on 15 May 1972, there have been close to five thousand various incidents and accidents (including over five hundred atrocious),⁴¹ but what was unusual this time was the age of

Sokushin Kichi Mondai Kyōgikai 沖縄県軍用地転用促進基地問題協議会, known as Guntenkyō 軍転協), but the bill was scrapped in 1980. The consequent efforts to enact the bill, joint by the largest Okinawa Prefecture Military Land Owners Union (Okinawa Ken Gunyōchi nado Jinushi Rengōkai 沖縄県軍用地等地主連合会, known as Tochiren 土地連) also ended in vain with the bill proposals being scrapped again in 1982 and 1991, before it finally become a law on 19 May 1995 (effective 26 May 1995, law no. 102).

⁴¹ Data for 1972-1995: 4,784 crimes including 511 atrocious (1972-2003: total 5,269

the victim. The girl was twelve years old when she was abducted by three U.S. service members on her way back home from shopping, and later raped. The news of the incident, reported first by *Ryūkyū Shimpō* four days later to protect the identity of the victim, followed by another that the three suspects were kept at Camp Hansen and that the Japanese investigation authorities were not able to take custody of them.

The reporting on the event sent a wave of shock throughout the prefecture. A fierce denunciation, series of protests,⁴² and demonstrations followed accompanied by demands for revision of the article 17 of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) stipulating the procedures for the delivery of criminals in custody. Later, people started calling not only for the reversion of that article, but the entire SOFA, which escalated into demands for reduction and closure of the bases, withdrawal of the marines, and even revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Organized soon after the incident on 21 October 1995, the Okinawa People's Rally Demanding Denunciation of the Rape Incident by U.S. service members and Revision of Status of Forces Agreement was attended by 85,000 people, becoming the biggest demonstration since Okinawa's reversion.⁴³

The Proxy

The rape incident happened around the time when Governor Ōta had to make a decision concerning a proxy sign for the use of land by the U.S. military. It was the second such decision for the “peace and antiwar” governor since he took over the office in the fall of 1990. The problem of proxy resurfaced every five years⁴⁴ because that was the length of a lease that the government could sign on behalf of private land owners who had been refusing to do it since the reversion (only two thirds of the U.S.

crimes, 540 atrocious). Okinawa Ken Sōmu Bu Chiji Kōshitsu Kichi Taisaku Shitsu (1995: 104; 2004: 85).

⁴² During one year of 1996, Naha Defense Facilities Administration Agency received over 250 protests and petitions against the bases. *Okinawa Times*, 31 December 1996.

⁴³ The data announced by the organizers. The prefectural police reported 58,000 participants.

⁴⁴ The period has been changing: from 1972 to 1982 – it was 5 years (twice extended), 1982-1992 – 10 years, and 1992-1997 – 5 years, according to the changes of laws enabling the lease against the land owners' will. In April 1997, the government revised the Special Measures Law on Land for U.S. Military Use (*Beigun yōchi tokuso hō* 米軍用地特措法), discussed in following chapters, and in 1999 passed the decentralization bill (*chihō bunken seibi hō* 地方分権整備法) that placed the proxy sign directly under the prime minister's jurisdiction (Takara 2000: 199). For the legal problems concerning the bases see, Urata (2000).

military land is owned by the central, prefectural or municipal governments).⁴⁵ In 1995, it was the thirty five antiwar land owners (*hansen jinushi* 反戦地主) who anew declined to sign, and so did the mayors of Naha and Okinawa cities, and the chief of the Yomitan village on their behalf. On 21 August 1995, couple of weeks before the rape, the central government requested hence Governor Ōta to sign a proxy for the recalcitrant owners. At that point, the governor had allegedly already decided not to sign the lease for several reasons, among which, as he explained afterwards in the Supreme Court, the Nye Report, released by the U.S. Department of Defense in February 1995, was one of the major factors. The Report declared sustaining the number of U.S. army in the Asia-Pacific at 100,000 level, while emphasizing the strategic importance of Okinawa. The governor feared, as he said, that it would lead to maintaining and even strengthening the U.S. forces stationed in the prefecture (Ōta 2000: 245-253; Ōta 1995: 22-28.). Having made up his mind on the proxy, Ōta toughened even further his position after the rape. On 28 September 1995, the final day set by the Naha Bureau of Defense Facilities Administration Agency (Naha Bōei Shisetsu Kyoku 那覇防衛施設局), the governor announced his refusal in the prefectural assembly, the decision which he conveyed to the central authorities the following day. In addition to the political unrest instigated by the rape, the central government was faced therefore with another problem, the proxy, which could have had far-reaching consequences for the national security. The irony of the situation was that the government at that time was led by the party that had opposed the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and stationing of the American bases in Japan until it formed coalition with the LDP on 30 June 1994. The Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) and its leader, Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, who in addition was an old friend of Vice Governor Yoshimoto from Jichirō – were caught in a dilemma. There was no choice however, and on 7 December 1995 the prime minister filed a suit against the governor, on 25 March 1996 the Fukuoka District Court ruled out in favor of the central government, and so did the Supreme Court in July and August later that year.⁴⁶ The Supreme Court in Japan has

⁴⁵ In 1995 33.3% of the land was owned by the central government, 3.6% – by the prefectural government, 30.4% – by the municipalities, and 32.7% by private people. The percentage has changed minimally through the 1990s. Okinawa Ken Sōmu Bu Chiji Kōshitsu Kichi Taisaku Shitsu (1995: 2).

⁴⁶ On 12 July 1996 the Supreme Court ruled out on the Sobe Communication Site, and on 16 July, on other eleven facilities including Kadena Air Station. On 28 August the governor decided not to appeal, thus ending the eleven-month legal battle.

tended to take neutral position on political issues, making the court procedure rather a formality, which has been referred to as the “judicial passive-ism” or “judicial neutralism,” especially after the political struggles in the 1950s (Muramatsu et al. 2001: 235-239). Thus the outcome of the trial against Governor Ōta ran along the well established patterns.

Despite the central government’s victory the political pressure the trial created was enormous.⁴⁷ The governor gained support from virtually all local groups, including the prefectural and municipal assemblies and numerous citizens groups. Both the local and national media extensively reported on the event and the extracts of the governor’s testimony in the Supreme Court on 10 July 1996, during which Ōta claimed the unconstitutionality of the military bases in Okinawa, covered the front pages of all the major newspapers and TV stations. Ōta was transformed from the local to the national hero and a national symbol of the “peace and antiwar” governor fighting the too powerful and overly centralized government in Tokyo.

Initial Local Demands

The strong public support and the political tension brought about by the trial created a situation that seemed to shift the balance of power in favor of the prefecture. Already at the end of 1995 during the strongest wave of demonstrations, the local leaders recognized the chance and undertook several actions directed first at resolution of the base problems, which as noted, preconditioned in their opinions execution of all the other development plans. Prime Minister Murayama on the other hand, although forced to file a suit against the governor, was very much in support of the prefectural undertakings (Fumoto 15 March 2004), and so was his party. The SDP, in fact, became one of the strongest proponents of the Okinawan case at the national level during the consecutive negotiations on the locally initiated policies.⁴⁸ One of the best proofs of the SDP support was already the passage of the aforementioned Okinawa U.S. Military Land Reversion Law in May 1995.

The first meeting of Prime Minister Murayama and Governor Ōta after the rape incident took place on 4 November 1995, during which the governor explained the prefectural development grand vision: the research results of

⁴⁷ On the media blitz in that period, see for instance, Andō (1997: 39-78).

⁴⁸ The SDP released several statements voicing its support for the prefectural plans (BRAP, CCFC Main Text and Deregulation Request) and advocating their execution as requested by the prefecture during the entire period under study. Shakai Minshutō. (1996, 1997).

the UERI Report, and the two-stage (later developed into three stages) plan for return of all the military bases, asking for the governmental assistance in their realization.⁴⁹ In response, Prime Minister Murayama promised to cooperate and also to create a forum, first for the prefecture and the central government to discuss the base related issues, the Okinawa U.S. Base Problems Council (Okinawa Beigun Kichi Mondai Kyōgikai 沖縄米軍基地問題協議会).⁵⁰ The establishment of the new institution was approved by the cabinet on 17 November 1995.⁵¹

At the meeting with the governor, the prime minister also pledged to press the U.S. government on the base issues. The promise was fulfilled two weeks later on 19 November during a meeting with the Vice President Al Gore. In consequence, Prime Minister Murayama and his American counter partner concluded agreement to establish Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) that was to investigate base closures and realignments in the prefecture. The SACO recommendations, and more precisely conditions for the military base returns proposed by the committee (intra-prefecture transfers),⁵² were to lead to a major conflict between the governor and the central government following year in autumn. Initially however, in November 1995, the establishment of SACO seemed to bring closer the probability of realization of prefectural development plans, and therefore after the second Ōta-Murayama meeting on 24 November, during which the prime minister reported on his discussions with the U.S. vice president, and the first meeting of the Okinawa U.S. Base Problems Council on 25 November, the prefecture was in a rush to prepare final policy proposals and obtain public support for them.

⁴⁹ It was summarized in a one-page outline of the Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept and Base Return Action Program (Tentative Draft) (*Kokusai toshi kōsō, kichi henkan no akushion puroguramu [Shian]* 「国際都市形成構想・基地返還アクションプログラム[試案]」).

⁵⁰ The participants included: the chief cabinet secretary, foreign minister, director general of the Defense Agency, and the governor of Okinawa.

⁵¹ On the same day, the prefectural Policy Coordination Counselor Takayama Chōkō explained the outline of the BRAP and CCFC Main Text at the meeting of the coalition parties' Foreign Affairs and Defense Joint Coordination Meeting on Okinawa Base Problems (Okinawa Kichi Mondai ni Kansuru Gaikō, Bōei Gōdō Chōsei Kaigi 沖縄基地問題に関する外交・防衛合同調整会議), the only available forum for such presentation at the time.

⁵² According to SACO agreement, approximately 21% of U.S. American bases and facilities in Okinawa (5,002 ha) were scheduled for closure and realignment, including the most disputed Futenma Air Station.

Policy Stream: The BRAP

The formation of the Base Return Action Program (BRAP), which proposed returns of all military bases located in Okinawa, and which in turn preconditioned the economic development, marks the first phase of the CCFC formation by the prefectural government. In the process, as detailed in this section, the biggest challenges were posed by the disintegrated operations of the prefectural office resulting from the problem of administrative sectionalism, in tackling of which the political and administrative skill of the local executives played an important role.

The Prefectural Office: CCFC and Base Return Project Team

In preparation for the official policy formation, Vice Governor Yoshimoto decided to make further organizational changes in the prefectural office aimed at, first, strengthening the CCFC policy making office, second, institutionalizing channels of direct communication with municipalities, and third, consolidating the operations of the entire prefectural office. First, the two-person CCFC Promotion Group, that was in charge of the CCFC and BRAP since April 1995, was enlarged almost six-fold into the eleven-member Cosmopolitan City Formation and Base Return Promotion Measures Project Team (Kokusai Toshi Keisei Oyobi Kichi Henkan Sokushin Taisaku Projecto Chīmu 国際都市形成及び基地返還促進対策プロジェクトチーム; hereafter cited as CCFC and Base Return Project Team) on 15 November 1995. Like its predecessor, the team was in charge of coordinating the policy formation and communication with other prefectural offices and various interest groups.

Second, the CCFC and Base Return Project Team, after holding several explanation meetings on the BRAP for municipalities (6-7 Dec. 1995), agreed with representatives of local communities to establish Cosmopolitan City Formation Municipalities Liaison Council (Kokusai Toshi Keisei Nado Shichōson Renraku Kyōgikai 国際都市形成等市町村連絡協議会; hereafter cited as CCFC Municipalities Liaison Council), which took off on 9 January 1996. The council consisted of municipal planning divisions' chiefs, and was divided into two main sections of the Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept Section (Kokusai Toshi Keisei Kōsō Bukai 国際都市形成構想部会) and the Base Return Concept Section (Kichi Henkan Kōsō Bukai 基地返還構想部会). As the names suggest, the two sections focused on the CCFC and the BRAP respectively, and were to bring the policy formation process to the lowest levels of self-government.

Third, to consolidate operations of the all prefectural departments, the Cosmopolitan City Formation Prefecture Liaison Council (Kokusai Toshi Keisei Chōnai Renraku Kyōgikai 国際都市形成庁内連絡協議会; hereafter cited as CCFC Prefecture Liaison Council) was established on 28 December 1995, following the secretaries meeting of the CCFC Prefecture Liaison Council two days earlier. The council consisted of all the department directors and the policy coordination counselor (Matayoshi Tatsuo), chaired by and directly supervised by the vice governor (Yoshimoto). Such integration of prefectural departments to coordinate work on the CCFC was necessary (Yoshimoto 2001), because of the problem of administrative sectionalism (*tatewari gyōsei* 縦割り行政) that pervades also to local level.⁵³ The prefectural governments, like the central government's ministries, are fragmented between various departments, linked more closely to the central agencies than to each other. In the prefectural office, there was no precedence for such coordinated and comprehensive policy making, and hence the new arrangements were met at first with some hesitation, suspicion, and even passive opposition that belated the policy formation on several occasions.⁵⁴ For the new policy

⁵³ The problem of administrative sectionalism or vertical administration refers to a situation where particular ministries based on the given authority pursue individual policies and do not coordinate its work with other organs, thereby making the policy often inconsistent. It refers not only to the inter-ministerial level but also to the intra-agency, epitomized in a phrase “bureaus but no ministry.” The causes of this state are rooted in the idea that the ministries to exhibit creativity have to be given freedom in the policy formation and organizational self-sufficiency. With the expansion of the administrative organs, the ministries enhanced their powers and started more firmly adhering to their opinions on matters that run against the work and competence of other ministries. To fight the problem of vertical administration obstructing comprehensive judgment of policies, and adversely effecting local governments, it was agreed that an introduction of administrative reforms and decentralization were necessary. The process started already in 1962 with the establishment of the First Provisional Administrative Reform Council (Dai Ichiji Rinji Gyōsei Chōsakai 第一次臨時行政調査会), which proposed strengthening the prime minister's position as the general coordinator and expanding the authorities of the Prime Minister Office. The administrative reform that took place in January 2001 decreased the number of governmental organs from one office and 22 ministries and agencies to one office and 12 ministries and agencies with the Cabinet Office (former Prime Minister Office) substantially expanded. On administrative sectionalism, see Muramatsu (1998: 95). On administrative reforms under the Hashimoto Cabinet, see <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/gyokaku/index.html>; Internet; accessed 18 July 2004.

⁵⁴ The CCFC Main Text submitted on 11 November 1996 was delayed from the initial September schedule for that reason. Fumoto (15 March 2004).

formation added more work for the departments without increasing their budget (at the initial stage at least), and also there were no standard operating procedures to follow (Fumoto 15 March 2004). In hand came the vice governor's organizational skills, which he acquired working for the Jichirō, as well as his long-held personal ties with the prefectural office staff, most of whom belong to the union. Thereby with time, the prefectural agencies became more coordinated and cooperative (Fumoto 15 March 2004; Yoshimoto 2001).

By mid December, the CCFC and Base Return Project Team formulated the first BRAP draft, which envisioned a complete return of all the bases in three stages (2001, 2010, and 2015). The timing of returns was decided based upon: (1) relevance of particular conversion plans to the CCFC, (2) local requests and demands for returns, (3) the readiness of the conversion plans being prepared by the municipalities, and (4) other local opinions and plans regarding particular facilities (Okinawa Ken 1996b: 2). The main argument justifying the claim for returns run along the aforementioned lines that the military bases hampered local economic development, and that their returns were crucial for the execution of development plans (CCFC), and thereby improvement of the living standard and well-being of local citizens.

The BRAP draft was discussed again with the representatives of municipalities between 22 and 25 December 1995, and later with various interest groups,⁵⁵ and influential local business group of the Okinawa Prefecture Economic Groups Confederation (Okinawa Ken Keizai Dantai Rengōkai 沖縄県経済団体連合会). The draft then went through the approval process on all levels: municipalities – at the CCFC Municipalities Liaison Council on 25 January 1996, the prefectural office – at the CCFC Prefecture Liaison Council on the following day; and the highest prefectural executive level – at the meeting of the governor, vice governors and the treasurer on 28 January (*Ryūkyū Shimpō*, 30 Jan. 1996). Governor Ōta officially presented the BRAP at the secretaries meeting of the Okinawa U.S. Base Problems Council on 30 January, and at the coalition parties Okinawa Base Problems Project Team (Okinawa Beigun Kichi Mondai Purojekuto Chīmu 沖縄米軍基地問題プロジェクトチーム) held on the same day.

Following the submission of the BRAP, the decision making process moved on the national level where the representatives of local community

⁵⁵ The powerful landowners association of Tochiren did not approve of the prefectural policy. *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, 12 January (evening edition), 17 January 1996.

did not participate. BRAP, differing in this respect from all the other policy initiatives contained in the CCFC, dealt with issues of the American military bases, or in other words, with issues of national security that are customarily monopolized by national governments. The decisions concerning BRAP were made therefore by the representatives of Japanese and American governments, which were announced in April 1996 in the SACO Interim Report and confirmed in the SACO Final Report released in December 1996. The decision making process on the national level concerning BRAP and other plans included in the CCFC goes beyond the scope of this research and will require further investigation. The factors accounting for the plans' formulation on the local level, and those that led to setting the local policy initiatives on the central government's decision agenda that are the focus of this research are summarized below.

Conclusion

In this study, I have examined the first phase of the locally-initiated policy making of the CCFC, arguing that it was a double coupling of streams of politics, problems and policy, first on the local, and second, on the national levels that led to policy formation in the prefecture, and later to setting the first part of the CCFC – the BRAP – on the national decision agenda. On the local level, the coupling included: (1-loc.) the ideology of local executive leaders in the politics stream, (2-loc.) the need of returns of the U.S. military land for economic development in the problems stream, and (3-loc.) policy proposals generated on local initiative under new governor in the policy stream. On the national level the coupling included: (1-nat.) public mood shaped by the reporting on the rape of a schoolgirl by the U.S. service members, and the ideology of the ruling party, the SDP in the politics stream; (2-nat.) refusal of the proxy for military land lease by Governor Ōta in the problems stream; and (3-nat.) the BRAP formed by the prefectural government in the policy stream, supported on the national level by a policy entrepreneur in person of Prime Minister Murayama. The process has several implications.

First, it demonstrates the importance of a double coupling of streams (politics, problems and policy) and of opening the policy windows on *both* the local and national levels due to the bounded system of local policy making. And since the conditions enabling policy formation have to occur first on the local level, the local government has to be in possession of a bargaining card vis-à-vis the central government that could allow inducing the central government to set the local policy on the national decision

agenda. One can assume that such necessity of double coupling further reduces the probability of locally-initiated policy.

Second, in addition to the bargaining card vis-à-vis the central government, which in the discussed period was the refusal of the proxy by the governor and other base-related problems, the process underscored the importance of the ideology of the ruling party – the SDPJ/SDP that led the coalition government at that time– in setting the local policy making on the national decision agenda.

Third, the analysis of the local policy formation on the local level demonstrated also that in addition to the precedence, the centrally designed policy framework plays an important role in shaping its content because it guarantees approval and a budget for their execution. Hence, the implications are that the local governments are likely to form policies that conform to the centrally-set standards rather than responding to local needs and specificities.

Fourth, the analysis also revealed the organizational and technical problems of local governments in preparing comprehensive local policy making, stemming from the deeper problems of administrative sectionalism and bounded system of local autonomy. To tackle those problems, the vice governor restructured the prefectural office, creating the policy making brain (CCFC and Base Return Project Team), the central coordination body (CCFC Prefecture Liaison Council) and communication channels with the lowest level of local governments (CCFC Municipalities Liaison Council). In solving those problems the qualities of the local executive leaders were crucial, such as their ideological convictions, political will to act, and administrative skills to manage organizations.

Fifth, the process underlined also the importance of personal ties and contacts between the main actors involved in the policy making (UERI – governmental officials; Ōta – Yoshimoto – Murayama; Yoshimoto – prefectural office staff) on the policy process. Although the impact of that factor is difficult to measure objectively, the actors themselves perceived them as essential for proper communication and execution of policies (Yoshimoto 2001; Fumoto 5 and 24 March 2004).

Finally, the CCFC, which was the first attempt by a local community at initiating a comprehensive local planning, presents a model case of an independent local policy making, and might be regarded as one of the first harbinger of unbounding initiative in local policy making.

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Mariusz K. Krawczyk

A Tale of Two Monies. Open Standard Versus Competing Standards in Electronic Money Payment Systems in Japan and Germany

Introduction

Technological progress has been a catalyst for great changes in human society ever since the Stone Age. From hunter-gatherer tribes, through feudal agrarian societies, to the urbanisation of the industrial age, to the information technology era the invention of the wheel, the construction of high seas going ships, the steam engine, the electricity, and computing devices each dramatically changed the route along which the human society evolves. The increase in computational power has been one of such spectacular milestones in the mankind evolution.

Amazing progress in information technology in recent years has profoundly changed our means of trade and payment. Unlike traditional ways of business, electronic commerce and finance can be performed with the intermediation of communication networks (i.e. the Internet) and do not require physical presence of merchants and their customers when transactions take place. As such, electronic transactions have allowed electronic commerce and electronic finance to reach customers with new products and new sales methods as well as for more efficient use of the already existing ones. But surprisingly, in spite of indeed amazing progress in the information technology, most of electronic transactions are currently settled by conventional means of payments (i.e. mainly credit and debit cards as well as transfers between bank accounts). These instruments have been designed for face-to-face real world transactions and they are by no means ideal for electronic transactions world. They require a lot of paper work, are costly to operate, prone to fraud (i.e. data skimming as they are operated by reading devices directly at the sales point) and, for these reasons, not suitable for small transactions and person-to-person transfers.

Yet in spite of their limitations the conventional money payment instruments probably will not be successfully replaced by electronic money in a near future. One possible explanation why electronic money has failed to penetrate the payments market, while at the same time electronic commerce and electronic finance seem to have been a success, is related to the nature of money as a network commodity¹. Money, including electronic

¹ The concept of money as a network commodity can be found already in Carl

money, is a typical network commodity and as such, its success or failure can be analysed through the concept of network externalities. This means that the increased utility for network users derives from the increase of their numbers (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Economides, 1996; van Hove, 1999.) Like in case of telephone network, the market for electronic money will not exist unless the number of users exceeds a critical (minimum) size (Economides and Himmelberg, 1995.) Difficulties in reaching the critical size of the market may explain, in my opinion, the failure of electronic money to penetrate retail payment markets. For compatibility, efficiency, regulatory etc reasons it is often difficult to develop a nationwide electronic money network. Japan may constitute an example of an economy where competing standards of electronic money (each system of electronic money is controlled by a separate issuer and is incompatible with other systems) create an obstacle to constructing such an efficient network. In contrast, Germany's open standard (with many issuers joining a common system) seems to have been more successful in reaching a critical size necessary for its existence. Characteristics of different business models prevailing in both countries may help to explain different performance of their electronic money systems².

Looking for answers concerning the conditions for success of electronic money in Japan, the paper compares the performance of Japan's competing closed systems with the performance of the open standard model adopted in Germany. The remaining of the article is organised as follows. The following section presents the definition and main features of electronic money. Third section shows the performance of the Japan's two competing electronic money standards. Fourth section presents main features of the

Menger's 1892 article "On the origin of money", one of the most influential papers on the theory of money. Menger reconstructs the emergence of money from barter transactions to "conventional" money, emphasising the fundamental role of the medium of exchange function of money and the fact that all other functions are only incidental to it. In his view the general use of money allows economic agents to establish a set of prices without the central authorities intervention. In modern terminology one could speak of a network effect of information (Streissler 2002).

² A specific business model developed in a post-war Japanese economy has been based on a dense human network within a firm itself and within the group of firms. Long-term employment and long-term relations between the core firm and subcontracting firms result in a market fragmentation and formation of closed to outsiders business groups. The Japanese business model favours numerous closed and competing technological standards developed by business groups against an open standard that dominates in European and American business models (Kawasaki 2004; Fransman 1990; Fransman 1995). The history of Japanese computer industry may be a good example of the Japanese business model.

GeldKarte, Germany's open standard of electronic money system. Fifth section attempts to provide some possible explanation why the performance of electronic money schemes in Japan is much less satisfactory than that of Germany's. The final section concludes the paper.

Definition and Main Features of Electronic Money

The term *electronic money* is used to describe "an electronic store of monetary value on a technical device that may be widely used for making payments to undertakings other than the issuer without necessarily involving bank accounts in the transaction, but acting as a prepaid bearer instrument" (ECB, 1998). Consumer purchases the electronic value (i.e. in a similar way as she or he would purchase traveller's checks) and then reduces the balances by using the device for purchases of goods and services. This definition of electronic money covers *prepaid cards* (often referred to as "electronic purses") and *prepaid computer software products* (often referred to as "digital cash"). The former, card-based products consist of plastic cards that contain real purchasing power stored on them. In contrast to the single-purpose prepaid cards (such as offered by telephone or railway companies), these are intended for use as a general, multipurpose means of payment. The latter form of electronic money employs specialised software on a personal computer and allows for transfers of value via telecommunication networks (i.e. the Internet). In both types of electronic money the value stored on the processor memories and transferred between them is represented by sets of electronic impulses. Moreover, as we can see later, the use of simple reading-writing devices attached to personal computers allows for the use of the card-based electronic money not only for face-to-face but also for network transactions.

It may be important to note that also conventional money instruments (let it be credit or debit cards) can be used for making payments via electronic means of communication. Here however the means of communication are used to *access* a customer's deposit account and to transfer the balances via communication network, such as the Internet or other telecommunication links. Conventional money electronic transactions typically require on-line authorisation and involve the debiting of the consumer's account after the transaction (separate settlement for each individual transaction). In contrast, electronic money does not require a separate confirmation that the customer's account is good for the transaction amount because the value is stored on the instrument itself. No need of saying, the confirmation (authorisation) procedures are usually costly and result in revealing

customer's identity (anonymity of use is one of the most important features of cash use). Let alone the privacy concerns, conventional money electronic payments are not often used for small purchases of goods and services because the processing costs (including authorisation, individual settlement procedures etc) via electronic payment instruments would represent too high share of the transaction costs. Conversely, electronic money may not be used for high-value transactions because of specific risks (related mainly to the behaviour of issuing institution and security concerns) that usually make it unlikely that the value stored on the instrument would be big enough for such transactions³.

Arnone and Bandiera (2004) summarise the main features of electronic money as follows. First, technical implementation of electronic money requires specific technological equipment. For that reason transaction costs tend to be higher compared to conventional bank notes. Second, electronic money represents liability on the balance sheets of a private issuer as opposed to conventional money that represents liability of a central bank. For that reason, not being a legal tender, electronic money can exploit network externalities to much less extent than conventional bank notes do and heavily depends on the size of the scheme (number of users, number of goods and services available, ease of access and so on). For the same reason, although easily transferred between merchants and customers, electronic money is usually not used in transactions between customers (peer-to-peer). Finally, transactions can be easily recorded depriving customers their anonymity⁴.

Electronic Money Schemes in Japan

The early attempts to introduce electronic money in Japan took place in late 1990s as a part of the government sponsored "Information Technology Revolution" that aimed at revitalising the country's sluggish economy through promotion of IT undertakings. A few pilot electronic money projects confined to small number of specific geographical areas (Kobe, Yokohama and Saitama) were based on a multipurpose prepaid card technology. Limited geographical proximity (cards could be used within one city only), limited availability of goods and services (small number of participating merchants), high costs of equipment (important obstacle for small local businesses), limited number of users (the same transaction was

³ See more on the electronic money specific risks in ECB (1998) and ECB (2003).

⁴ Although, as we can see later, there have been also schemes, like Germany's GeldKarte, that allow for partial at least anonymity of transaction.

possible by using cash without all complicated preparations etc) and so on resulted in abandoning the projects without follow-up.

As a consequence of the failure to introduce electronic money schemes at the turn of centuries Japan payments remained dominated by cash and credit card transactions. Single-purpose prepaid cards constituted the only challenge to the domination of conventional money payment systems. A wide range of single-purpose prepaid cards has been used in Japan in last 20 years. Since the early 1980s they have been widely accepted for paying for public telephone (however recently in decline due to widespread use of cellular phones), railways, buses, public toll roads etc. Prepaid cards are not subject to banking supervision but since 1989 the card issuers have to deposit with the legal affairs bureau of the Ministry of Justice funds equivalent to half of the unused value of issued cards. This regulation is meant to protect the interests of cardholders. As number of prepaid card users increased over time, also the networks of companies providing services that could be paid for by using a single card have been also gradually developed (originally each company had its own prepaid card system). Most of cards are simple magnetic ones but some of the issuing companies have introduced also more sophisticated instruments such as for instance contact-less smart cards. In recent years, new services such as possibility to reload a card or possibility to make deferred payments as credit cards do have also become available.

In such an environment, after the failure of the government-sponsored schemes, two experiments with the electronic money have developed into commercial use since November 2001. First, JR East (East Japan Railway Company) introduced its stored value fare card *SUICA* (acronym for super urban intelligent card) equipped with contact-less chip technology. The card, intended to replace magnetic commuting cards, allows passengers to pass through station gates without placing the card into the automatic wickets slots and helps to smooth the traffic on extremely congested station gates. Apparently due to cost considerations (contact-less chip is much more expensive to produce than a simple magnetic card) the company opted for re-loadable instead of disposable card. The card can be reloaded at JR East ticket vending machines with JPY 20,000 as the maximum value that can be stored on it. Starting from the end of 2003 the use of the then single purpose *SUICA* cards has been expanded to purchase of goods at JR East operated outlets and almost at the same time the card was equipped with credit card function (using the JR East controlled credit card company service). The *SUICA* card proved to be very popular with the JR East customers and by October 2004 there had been more than 10 million cards

issued but the use of the card is largely limited to the Tokyo area (with very few exceptions for limited use in Osaka and Sendai). Therefore, despite of gradual expanding the card's functions⁵ *SUICA* remains a closed system/single issuer multipurpose stored value card. The closed system character greatly reduces the card's ability to expand beyond the natural boundaries of its issuer's business area.

EDY (acronym for euro, dollar and yen) has been the second experiment with electronic money payment that has been successfully implemented in Japan. The scheme has been operated by bitWallet Inc. since November 2001. Although basically card based, *EDY* can be also used via mobile phones (through the NTT DoCoMo network) and via the Internet. The card, based on the same as *SUICA* contact-less technology developed by Sony, can be used at designated merchants terminals or via the Internet using personal computer software called *Pasori*. It can be reloaded at designated merchants terminals or via the Internet using a credit card. The maximum value that can be stored on the card is JPY 50,000. It does not allow for cardholder-to-cardholder transfers nor, despite of its name, for any cross-border or multi-currency transactions. Since June 2003 the *EDY* scheme has been combined with All Nippon Airways mileage programme what greatly helped to expand the card at the country's airport network. As of May 2005 there have been 10,2 millions cards issued (including almost 2 million mobile phone based "electronic purses") with approximately 20,000 retail outlets accepting payments nationwide and 9,3 million transactions per month⁶. Comparing to locally confined *SUICA*, the *EDY* retail network is much more evenly spread around the country but still the card's closed system/single issuer character has been limiting its expansion abilities. Apparently for security reasons the issuer bitWallet Inc. seems not to be willing to accept new issuing partners from the outside of its own network.

⁵ As for instance, exchange of perks between the *SUICA* and the Japan Airlines mileage programme since October 2004 as well as sharing the mobile phone technology of two major providers (NTT DoCoMo and KDDI since July 2005). There are also plans for expanding the *SUICA* operations to private railways in Tokyo and including cash card function for major banks (Mizuho Bank, Mitsubishi Tokyo UFJ, Resona Bank etc). More information on the *SUICA* is available from <http://www.jreast.co.jp/suica/> (in Japanese).

⁶ Designated merchants accepting the card payments include major convenience store chains (am/pm, Popura, Lawson etc), major electric appliances store (Yodobashi Camera, K's Denki), McDonalds etc. In December 2005 the number of transactions reached for the first time 100 million per year. More information on the *EDY* is available from <http://www.edy.jp/> (in Japanese).




Figure 1. Single-issuer/closed system of electronic money

Both Japanese electronic money schemes represent an example of non-compatible competing standards as they are based on a model with a single issuing/system operating company as shown in Figure 1. The flows of value are similar to those that take place in cash payment system involving an issuing institution (central bank in cash payment system), intermediary distributing the value to consumers (commercial banks in cash payment system), and the retail system. A single issuer creates electronic value and issues it via loading terminals or via the Internet to customers against conventional money deposits. Customers use the value for their payments in retail network. Then merchants can claim the value against the electronic value they deposit with the issuer. The cycle ends with final settlement performed by the conventional banking system.

Two features of the scheme seem to be worth mentioning. First, all transactions take place between the single calculation centre and the card itself. Therefore all of them are registered separately and there is no place for anonymity of transactions at all. Second, the system's ability to expand is limited by the issuer's ability to expand. At the moment the issuing company reaches its optimal size the closed system acquires an internal conflict; for its customers further expansion is necessary for fully utilising network externalities while from the issuing company point of view further

expansion is not desirable. Increasing the number of issuing companies would be an immediate (but impossible under closed system) solution.

Electronic Money in Germany

In contrast to the Japanese non-compatible competing standards, Germany has adopted an open standard type of electronic money scheme⁷. Initiated in 1996, the GeldKarte, Germany's electronic money scheme, has been a joint undertaking of the entire banking industry. All four German banking associations have supported the scheme⁸. While the banks issue the cards the entire scheme is overviewed and controlled by the Central Credit Committee (Zentraler Kreditausschuss). The basic working of the GeldKarte system is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Multiple-issuer/open system of electronic money

⁷ There are currently two card-based electronic money schemes in operation in Germany; apart from the widely used GeldKarte there is also the PayCard scheme developed by the German Railways and the Deutsche Telekom. Since the use of the latter is marginal the paper reviews the working of the GeldKarte scheme. More information about the PayCard scheme is available from BIS (2004).

⁸ That is the Association of German Cooperative Banks (Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken - BVR), the Association of German Private Banks (Bundesverband der Deutschen Banken - BdB), the Association of German Public Sector Banks (Bundesverband Öffentlicher Banken - VÖB) and the German Savings Banks Association (Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband - DSGV).

Each card issuing institution creates and issues electronic value to its customers. The issued electronic value is then used for payments for goods and services. Participating merchant businesses deposit received value with participating financial institutions and receive conventional value instead. The resulting inter-bank payments are settled via country's conventional financial system. The scheme operates as an open standard and can be joined (and left) by any issuing and retailing institution willing to follow its regulations.

After pilot trial had been run in city of Ravensburg-Weingarten in 1996, the German savings banks (Sparrkassen) began equipping their cash cards with the GeldKarte chips (1997). In 1998 the majority of McDonald's restaurants in Germany installed the payment and loading terminals for GeldKarte cards. Given the popularity and the size of McDonald's franchise it was an important milestone for expanding the card throughout the country. In 1999 another step was taken when first public parking lots introduced the GeldKarte payment devices. This, together with electronic ticketing function introduced in the city of Bremen initiated in 2000 (the card itself became a paperless ticket under the scheme), strengthened the card's image as a convenient mean for small cashless payments. One of perhaps most important steps in expanding the GeldKarte network took place in 2001 when the German Post introduced the card reading devices at its 13,000 post offices and 6,000 stamp vending machines. In 2002 and 2003 large number of acceptance points have been established in major cities of Hamburg, Leipzig and Munich. Since 2003, when the GeldKarte reading devices have been introduced, the card can be also used for transactions on the Internet. In 2005 the German association of tobacco wholesalers and vending machine operators equipped their 120,000 tobacco vending machines with the GeldKarte compatible devices and, in order to reach out to huge Turkish minority living in Germany, the GeldKarte Website in Turkish language has been launched⁹.

There are two types of the card currently available; bank account linked and stand-alone card. In case of the former one, the GeldKarte microchip is fitted into a bank card and the cardholder uses a loading terminal for transferring desired money balances from her (his) bank account into the card (he or she must use PIN - a personal identification number). With using the PIN it resembles a simple cash withdrawal (and as such is possible around the country) like in Figure 3.

⁹ More facts (including practical use guide) and data are available from <http://www.geldkarte.de/> (in German, Turkish and English).




Figure 3. Loading transaction with the GeldKarte

Source:

http://www.geldkarte.de/ww/en/pub/rund_um_die_geldkarte_en/hintergruende_en/technischerablauf_en.htm

After the loading has been confirmed with the loading centre, the cardholder's bank is notified and the cardholder's account is debited with loading amount and the commission fee (usually between EUR 0.08 and 0.3 – more if loading involves more banks than one). Up to EUR 200 can be loaded into a single card. At that moment the GeldKarte itself becomes a real electronic purse ready for purchases of goods and services. Apparently for security reasons the system operator creates also a shadow account tracing customer's transactions. Bank account linked cards can be also equipped with debit card function.

Stand-alone card (sometimes called a "white card") is not linked with any bank account and, in order to reload it, customer must deposit cash

balances to a bank that supervises the particular loading terminal the customer is using for reloading. In such a case the account debiting operation in Figure 3 does not take place. After having been reloaded the stand-alone card can be used exactly the same way the account-linked one is.




Figure 4. Payment transaction with the GeldKarte

The actual payment, as presented in Figure 4, takes place off-line. To make a payment, the card is inserted into a terminal at a checkout point (merchant's terminal) or into a slot in a vending machine. At the checkout point, the customer must confirm the amount required for transaction payment (it is not necessary when a vending machine is used). As the payment does not involve authorisation system (contrary to individual settlement transactions with credit and debit cards) no PIN or signature is required. The amount payable is automatically deducted from the balances stored on the card's chip and credited to the merchant's chip that sits in the terminal. Off-line procedures closely resemble cash payment allowing to

keep transaction costs to minimum and to reduce the time necessary for payment to materialize. In addition it means that the details of transactions are stored only on the cards and only the cardholder knows what the money has been spent on. The same procedure is possible without physical contact between merchant and customer. Using specially designed card readers payment can also take place via the Internet.

Comparing to conventional money electronic payment systems (i.e. credit cards and debit cards transactions) the use of the GeldKarte has advantages for both the buyer and the seller: the buyer can pay simply and anonymously, and the seller has the guarantee that payment has actually been made – as in case of conventional cash payments.

The merchant closes the day with a so-called reconciliation. During reconciliation the merchant's chip card generates a cumulative total from all the transaction data that have been stored during a day. This total data record comprises and automatically encrypts all the individual transactions. Each total data record can be clearly identified by means of the identification number of the merchant chip and a serial number of the reconciliation. Using these code numbers and the serial numbers of the individual transactions, the merchant transaction registration centre used by the merchant's bank can later check whether transactions have not been submitted more than once. The payment amounts are credited to the merchant's account after he has submitted the individual transactions and the total data records to the merchant registration centre.

The customer transaction registration centre then charges the value of the transactions conducted by the cardholders to the settlement accounts of the banks that issued the cards. At the same time, payments made are deducted from the shadow account of the individual GeldKarte used. Since payments are not cleared individually, but only in the form of totals, it is not possible for the banks to "pry" into customer transactions. It is very important for anonymity of transactions.

The use of the GeldKarte costs commonly EUR 5 per year for the customer. Reloading the card costs between EUR 0.08 and EUR 0.3 with the consumer's bank (using a bank different than the one managing account involves additional commission fees). The merchant's cost amounts to 0.3% of the transaction amount.

62 millions GeldKarte cards issued by approximately 3,500 institutions that circulated in Germany in 2003 were used for nearly 40 million payments at approximately 133,000 acceptance points. Approximately nine in ten adults in Germany have been using their version of electronic money card (each household has at least one card). On average USD 75 million

was stored on cards. Approximately 107,000 transactions took place daily reaching the value of more than USD 209,000 (USD 1.95 per transaction). Electronic money transactions amounted to 8.6% of all transactions in 2004 and by far surpassed the share of credit card transactions (approximately 5% of all transactions).¹⁰ It can be argued that the GeldKarte network has already reached the size necessary for become a self-feeding mechanism and allows its customers to enjoy the benefits of its size.

What is Different about the Electronic Money Schemes in Japan and in Germany?

The Germany's GeldKarte electronic money is usually considered one of the best performing among all electronic money schemes introduced to date. On the contrary, the Japanese electronic money schemes seem to have difficulties to reach a critical mass of customers. Both Japanese schemes are far smaller than the Geldkarte both in terms of the number of users (approximately 10 million each against 62 million in Germany) and the number of merchants participating in the scheme (approximately 20,000 participating in each of Japanese schemes against more than 133,000 merchants participating in Germany).

There are a few reasons that could explain differences in performance of both countries' electronic money. First, and perhaps the most important one, is the different standard adopted in both countries. The single-issuer/closed standard system limits the size of the entire system to the processing capacity of the issuing/operating company. Once the company reaches its maximum size, the network cannot expand any more and loses its ability to utilise the benefits of the network externalities. This has been the case with the Japanese electronic money issuers. Despite of their relatively successful implementation both systems remain confined to limited geographical areas (*SUICA*) or have problems with expanding beyond the boundaries of given business area (*EDY* is associated mainly with airline and airport industries). On the contrary, the open character of the German scheme allows for increasing the number of issuing institutions almost indefinitely and expanding the network even beyond the national boundaries¹¹. And because of the character of money as a network

¹⁰ *Die Bank*, November 20th 2003, BIS (2004), <http://www.geldkarte.de/>.

¹¹ Apart from technological potential, expanding a successful electronic money system abroad is possible also because the European institutions face a common regulatory framework for the electronic money supervision set by the European Parliament and Council Directives 2000/46/EC (on the taking-up, pursuit and prudential supervision of

commodity, the more people use a certain commodity as money the more they tend to accept it as money. The value of money derives not from its intrinsic value but from the confidence of those who use it as money that it will be always accepted as a form of payment. Needless to say, the same holds for both conventional and electronic money.

Another important difference between both countries originates from their cards design. As shown in the preceding section, the payment with the GeldKarte takes place off-line. The data is transferred between the customer's card chip and merchant's card chip. Only later, consolidated data is transferred in the form of day reconciliation to the operating centre. This preserves the anonymity of transaction. On the contrary the system adopted by the Japanese issuers allows for tracing each transaction and does not allow for anonymity of payment (precisely as it happens in case of credit card and debit card transactions). As anonymity of transactions is one of the most important features of cash payments, the features of the GeldKarte resemble closer cash than the features of Japanese electronic money as shown in Table 1. This may be one of the reasons why the German consumer is more likely to choose electronic money than the Japanese consumer is.

	Cash	SUICA, EDY	GeldKarte
Common acceptability	Yes	No	No
Legal tender	Yes	No	No
Payment finality	Yes	No	Yes
Anonymity	Yes	No	Yes
Intermediation costs	No	Yes*	Yes*
Instant settlement	Yes	No	No
Verifiability	Partial	Yes	Partial
Peer to peer	Yes	No	No
Offline transactions	Yes	No	Yes
Inventory	Yes	Yes	Yes

*retailers

Table 1. Basic features of electronic money in Japan and Germany as compared to cash

The two above factors; the closed character of the electronic money networks chosen by the Japanese issuers and the design of payment

the business of electronic money institutions) and 2000/28/EC (regulating the taking-up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions).

mechanism that does not provide customers with much desired anonymity seem to produce the most general explanation for different performance of electronic money systems in both countries. There are however also some country-specific factors behind the difficulties the electronic money schemes face in Japan.

First, the Japanese electronic money schemes appeared on the market relatively late comparing to Germany's. The GeldKarte was introduced in 1996-1997 and soon after that time the Japanese government promoted the later failed electronic money schemes in Kobe, Yokohama and Saitama. The Japanese needed another four years to return with new systems that were better fit for the needs of the Japanese economy. These years provided credit card companies with invaluable time to establish their dominating position in the market for electronic payments. By the end of March 2001 (half a year before *SUICA* and *EDY* made their debut on the market) there had already been 232 million credit cards circulating in Japan (almost two per one person) and the value of payments made by credit cards amounted to 23 trillion yen (almost 200 billion US dollars, BIS, 2003). Competing with world-wide networks of VISA and MASTER cards the electronic money issuers can hardly offer their customers new quality of service while imposing at the same time a burden on participating retailers (costs of hardware, staff training etc). On the contrary, the GeldKarte has already surpassed credit cards as a mean of payments.

Second, one should not neglect the influence that the overall condition of the Japanese financial sector has had on development of technological innovations in the country's financial industry. Most of the country's financial institutions have been still suffering from the outbreak of the banking crisis. The Japanese banks, unable to raise their profit margins from their main lending activities (i.e. lending to corporate customers) and suffering from the fall-out from the non-performing loan crisis are not able to invest seriously in the technological progress. For that reason they have no choice but to charge their customers with the costs of introducing new technologies. Therefore, as it often happens in Japanese consumer-business relations, it is customers and small retailers that are charged with not only banks' commissions but also with costs of purchasing terminals, connecting lines etc. It has been by no means an accident that it is non-financial firms that develop many new financial products and services in Japan. On-line banking business has been vigorously promoted by an electronics producing company, retail round-the-clock banking services have been revolutionised by a major supermarket chain, electronic money system has been developed by a major railway company and so on. On the

contrary, the Germany's electronic money has been more or less supported by country's entire banking industry. One can only hope that after the current restructuring in Japanese banking industry ends, the banks will be able to invest in financial innovations again.

Third, Japanese public has in general a very strong preference for cash rather than other forms of payment. Compared to other countries cash is used extensively in Japan. The ratio of cash to nominal GDP (14.4% at the of 2001) is the highest among the industrial nations. Bank of Japan (2002) offers a few reasons that may explain this phenomenon. First, cash has been traditionally playing a significant role in the life habits of ordinary Japanese. For instance cash gifts in clean (i.e. unused) notes that are traditionally presented at predetermined occasions increase the role cash plays in the society. Second, as Japan has a relatively low crime rate, carrying cash does not pose any serious risk. Third, due to well-developed nationwide network of ATMs¹², cash is easily and cheaply accessible. Banks, competing with nationwide postal savings network usually do not charge fees for cash withdrawals from their own ATM while the charge for withdrawals via other bank's ATM carries a small fee unrelated to the amount of cash withdrawn. Fourth, as anti-counterfeiting measures seem to have been effective and inflation rate has been very low (in fact it was negative for most of the last decade) the Japanese public continues to have a lot of confidence in nation's cash. Finally, although not often officially voiced, there is also an argument that the miserable condition of the country's banking industry resulted in distrust towards financial institutions and made individuals to flee into cash away from banking deposits¹³.

Needless to say, the dominating position of cash in settlement of every day transactions does not make it easy for other forms of payment (including electronic money) to develop. It must be a lot easier to offer new forms of payment in a society without such a strong cash preference.

Conclusions

Adopting closed competing standards for finding optimal solutions to technological and economic problems seems to have a long tradition in the Japanese business community. The winner in such a competition would

¹² The country has almost twice as many ATM per 1 million inhabitants as the US or Germany. And since 1999 most of financial institutions have linked their ATMs with the Post Office ATM system that covers the entire country with its almost 26,000 ATM network (Krawczyk, 2006).

¹³ The relation of cash to banking deposits increased by nearly one-third during the 1990s (Krawczyk, 2006).

next establish a nation wide standard while the loser would descent into obscurity¹⁴. Although this approach seemed to have worked well in developing new technologies, adopting a similar policy for establishing an electronic money system does not seem to have worked equally well. Comparing to the Germany's open standard electronic money scheme, the Japanese competing systems performance is rather far from being satisfactory. Let aside factors specific to the Japanese economy as consumers' preference for cash, poor state of the country's financial industry after the collapse of the asset inflated bubble economy or dominating position of credit card companies in the market for electronic payments, one possible explanation is that closed competing standards approach is rather not working well in case of money market because it does not allow for utilising the character of money as a network commodity. On the contrary, adopting open standard for electronic money and choosing winners within the standard allows for reaching benefits of network externalities.

Another question is what is necessary for the electronic money to succeed in Japan. Aside from adopting an open standard for electronic money market like Germany has done, Japan needs also a sound regulatory framework similar to the Directive 2000/46/EC that regulates the electronic money market activities in the European Union. Finally, involvement of central institutions coordinating the electronic money scheme (e.g. Japanese Bankers Association) might be necessary in light of fierce competition the electronic money faces from credit card companies. The Germany's Central Credit Committee has supervised the GeldKarte project from the very beginning with very good results. Without such an involvement of central authorities chances for the electronic money to succeed in Japan may not be good.

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¹⁴ The outcome of the video format competition between Sony's "Beta" and JVC's VHS standards or more recent dispute surrounding digital video disc standard are just the most known examples of the business practices in Japan.

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<http://www.edy.jp/>

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<http://www.jreast.co.jp/suica/>

聞き手の言語行動に関する日本語会話とポーランド語会話の比較分析

従来の日本語研究の成果により、日本語会話においては、聞き手の役割が円滑な談話進行に大きな役割を果たしていることが明らかになっている。そこで、日本語の会話教育では、話し手の技術のみでなく、聞き手の技術の適した指導も重要になる。ポーランド人日本語学習者に教えるにあたっては、彼らが母語での会話をどのように行っているかを知る必要があるが、残念ながら、ポーランド人の会話管理技術について取り上げた先行研究は見当たらない。本稿は、日本語母語話者の会話とポーランド語母語話者の会話では、聞き手の言語行動がどのように違うかを、自然談話資料を基に比較分析した、筆者の修士論文を紹介するものである。

今回は、聞き手の言語的反応がどの程度の頻度で会話の中に現れるかについての検証結果を述べる。会話中の全発話に占める聞き手の発話の割合は、日本語会話の方がかなり大きく、日本語話者はあいづちが多いという先行研究の結果は、対ポーランド語話者でも同じであることがわかった。以後、聞き手の言語的反応の種類、出現場所、発話権取得の方法等について順次本誌にて紹介する予定である。拙稿が、ポーランド人学習者への日本語教育に携わる教師の方々や日本語を学ぶポーランド人の方々に、教育上、学習上の何らかの一助となれば幸いである。

0. はじめに

会話は通常、口論などの特殊な状況を除き、原則的には一人の話者が話し手として発話をし、他の参加者は聞き手に回って自分の発話順番(turn)を待つという規則が機能している (Sacks 他:1974)。しかし聞き手も、相手の発話中にく聞いています・理解しています・同感です>等のメッセージを、日本語では「うん／そうそう」など、ポーランド語では「mhm／no」などの実際の発話で相手に伝える。これらの聞き手の言語的反応は、日本語では主に「あいづち」、英語では Back Channel と呼ばれ、両言語での先行研究は多い。では、ポーランド語話者のあいづち行動は、一体どのような様相を見せるだろうか。

本稿は初回であるので、最初に、第1項では筆者が修論研究の材料とした会話資料及びその分析方法について、少し紙面をさいて紹介する。次に第2、第3項で、今回のテーマである「聞き手の言語的反応の頻度」に関する分析結果を述べる。

1. 資料と分析方法

1-1. 資料

本研究で用いた自然談話資料は、主に20代の女性2人による体面会話をテープに録音した音声資料で、対話者同士は親しい友人の間柄である。日本語母語話者を7組、ポーランド語母語話者を7組、全14組の日常会話を収集し、各会話から20分ずつ抽出して計4時間40分の会話を分析資料とした。会議や深刻な相談事などではなく、会話自体を楽しむおしゃべりであることを条件にした上で、その他の、話題・録音の場所・時間・場面等の各条件は被験者が自由に設定できるようにし、会話の自然さの確保に努めている。抽出した会話は文字化し、さらに、短いポーズによって区切られる単位を「一発話」として区切り、分析単位とした。これはメイナード(1993)が用いたPPU(Pause-bounded Phrasal Unit: ポーズによって区切られる語句という単位で、音声言語面から比較的容易に、また客観的に認定できる)という概念を採用した。なぜならば、話し言葉では、言い直しや言い淀み、同一語句の反復、語順の転換などがしばしば起き、非文法的な表現や不完全文がよく現れるので、十分に推敲され完成した書き言葉のように規則性がない。また、聞き手からの割り込み、会話場面の外部現象の影響を受けて、話者の発話内容も中断したり突然話題が転換したりする。従って、話し言葉の場合は、書き言葉のように規範的法則にのっとった言語表象を基準にして成分化し単位を決める方法は適さず、思考の単位に連結する発話の単位はポーズという外部現象を基準にして区分するのが最も適していると考えたためである。

ポーズにより細分化された全会話は、日本語話者7組で7, 324発話、ポーランド語話者7組で4, 415発話となった。以下は、会話を文字化したスクリプトの例である。「/」で区切られた単位が、本研究で「発話」と呼ぶものである。両者の発話の位置、重なりが視覚的に分かるよう、2行1組として、時間の経過とともに横に書き進む形で表記した。従って、話者Aと話者Bの発話が上下で

位置的に重なっていれば、そこでは同時発話が起きていることを意味する。

※日本語会話のSCRIPT例※

岡田：てゆうか屁理屈ばかりゆうやろし。／難しいね小学生は。／
清水：うん／
岡田：幼稚園生の方がまだ簡単やわ。／
清水：ほんまやな／ うん／小学校の先
岡田：なあ、ほんまそれ！／なあ！／
清水：生とかようやらんわ。／ 全部教えなあかんし。／

※ポーランド語会話のSCRIPT例※

Ania:
Gosia: te dzieciaki z miasta, kojarzą, to są bardziej rozwydzone, tak jest, to
Ania: mhm／
Gosia: nie, że tylko gadanie, ale to widać, bardziej takie złośliwe.／
Ania:
Gosia: A mimo wszystko te dzieci jeszcze ze wsi są takie spokojniejsze,／
Ania: A nie boisz się takiej
Gosia: ee, bardziej jakby słuchają, boją się jeszcze, nie.／

この例でも分かるように、日本語会話ではポーランド語会話に比べ、PPUで区切られる一つの発話が短く、また、話者の発話の重なりがポーランド語会話に比べて多い。同時間（7組各20分で計140分）の日本語話者とポーランド語話者の発話数に現れた、1.6倍以上の差はここに起因する。

このように、PPUにより細分化した総11,739発話を基礎データとして、機能による分類、計量的調査、発話の重複現象の観察を行い、日本語母語話者とポーランド語母語話者の会話管理技術を、主に聞き手の発話に視点をおいて検証した。続いて発話の具体的な分類法を述べる。

1-2. 分析方法

発話には、その話題展開において、主流に積極的、直接的な影響力を与える発話と、直接的ではないが間接的な影響力を与える発話がある。端的に言えば、当該話題を展開する話し手の発話が前者であり、聞き手の発話が後者である。例えば上述した日本語会話のスク

リプト例を見ていただきたい。「てゆうか屁理屈ばかり～まだ簡単やわ。」までの岡田の3発話は、ここでの話題展開に主たる影響力を持つ発話であり、岡田が話し手としての主導権を握っている。一方、清水の「うん」及び「ほんまやな」（共通語では「本当だね」）の2発話は、聞き手としての反応、あいづちであり、話題展開に主たる影響力は持たない。しかしながら、誰しも自分や人々の会話行動を観察すれば分かるように、話し手は、理解や共感を示す聞き手からのメッセージを受ければ、心地好くなり安心し、自分の話題展開に自信を持って話を先に進めるし、逆に、非共感や不快感や無関心を示す聞き手からのメッセージを受ければ、話題を変更するか、相手に主導権を渡すか、あるいはその話題に関係する必要な情報を提供して説明を試み、理解・共感を求めるか、何がしかの軌道修正を図る¹。即ち、聞き手の発話も、話し手が話題を展開するにあたって、副次的、間接的な影響力を持つのである。本研究では、前者、主に話し手が発する²、話題展開に主たる影響力を持つ、ないしその意図を持つ発話を主ターン発話（A）と名づけ、後者、話題展開に間接的な影響力を持つ発話を副ターン発話（B）と名づけ

¹本研究では、親しい友人同士のおしゃべり、即ち<楽しい時間を共有し、友好的人間関係を維持するために行う相互行為である会話>に限定して研究しているので、当然ながら、その他の会話状況においては、話し手がとる対応はこの限りではない。

²「主に話し手が…」としたのは、聞き手も時にこの主ターン発話を発するからである。即ち、発話権の獲得を目的として、話し手の発話中に聞き手が発する割り込み発話である。

次の会話例（下線部）では、Agata と Marzena が同時発話で主導権を争っており、両者ともいわば話し手であって、ここに聞き手は存在しない。従って、話題展開の主導権を担う発話だけでなく、その意図を持つ発話も含めて、本研究では主ターン発話（A）と呼ぶ。

例) 資料ポ6（ポーランド会話第6組）

Agata:

Marzena: w ogóle no ci ludzie byli tacy otwarci, tacy, tacy kochani, no tacy, wiesz,

Agata: Ale daj spokój! / Wiesz co, / na przykład w „Potop” to tam nie

Marzena: zupełnie bezproblemowi, / oni to, słuchaj, cały czas by nami się zajmowali.

アガタ :

マジェナ: ホント彼らってすごいオープンでいい人達で、こう、こう、分かるでしょ、

アガタ : 冗談! あのね、例えば「洪水(Potop)」なんて本には…

マジェナ: すごくつきあいやすくてさ、彼ら、聞いてよ、ずっと私達の世話して

て大分類し、更はその発話機能によってそれぞれ17種類に下位分類した(表1)。

表1【発話機能の分類表】

A[主ターン発話]		B[副ターン発話]	
A 1	注目要求	B 1	促し
A 2	談話表示	B 2	理解・納得表明
A 3	情報提供	B 3	共感・賛同表明
A 4	意見・感情表明	B 4	非共感・不賛同表明
A 5	共感・同意要求	B 5	情報提供・肯定表明
A 6	情報要求	B 6	立場不確定な発話
A 7	意見・感情表明要求	B 7	感情表明
A 8	共同行為要求	B 8	感想表明
A 9	単独行為要求	B 9	うち消し
A 10	確認	B 10	確認
A 11	フィラー等	B 11	くり返し
A 12	リズム応答	B 12	フィラー等
A 13	自己内発話	B 13	言い換え・総括
A 14	強い感情表明	B 14	先取り
A 15	言い直し要求	B 15	訂正
A 16	言い直し・訂正	B 16	自己内発話
A 17	未完結発話	B 17	間もたせ発話

これら発話機能の下位分類はザトラウスキー(1993)の発話機能分類を基盤としたが、筆者の収集した資料中に観察された各発話の機能を検討した結果、加筆ないし削除した項目がある。

ここでは紙面の都合上、発話数の割合の多い、代表的な一部の発話機能についてのみ、実例を挙げて紹介する。なお、スクリプト中にある(2.0)のような記載は、ここで2秒のポーズがあったことを示しており、☆記号は、笑いや照れなどの感情により当該発話の語末が吸気音などを伴って変化していることを示している。

< A 2 : 談話表示 >

談話展開の指標となる発話で、前後の文脈をつなぐ接続表現の役割を持つもの。「だから」「だって」「**więc** (だから)」「**i** (それで)」「**w końcu** (結局)」等がある。

例) 資料ポ 5 (ポーランド語会話第 5 組)

Ania: zawsze jest, wiesz..., / fajniej. / (2.0) **No bo,** / co fajnie jest mieć prawo jazdy.

Gosia:

アニャ : いつも、ねえ… / いいよね。 / だってさ、免許持ってるといいよ。

ゴシヤ :

< A 3 : 情報提供 >

話し手の意見や感情ではなく、客観的な事実に関する情報を提供する発話。

例) 資料日 1 (日本語会話第 1 組)

岡田 :

えーっ! /

清水 : やまじ、さえぼんが / 卒業した後つきあい出さはって。 /

< A 4 : 意見・感情表明 >

話し手の意思、意見や感情を表明する発話。

例) 資料ポ 5 (ポーランド語会話第 5 組)

Alicja: mhm /

Klaudia: O! Chełmońskiego lubię. Te są bardzo realistyczne. / Pamiętasz ten obraz?

アリツイア : うん /

クラウディア : あ、Chełmoński とか好きだわ。すごく写実的で。 / あの絵覚えてる?

< A 5 : 共感・同意要求 >

相手の共感・同意を求める発話で、「～でしょう?」「～だよなあ」「…,nie?»等の表現が見られる。

例) 資料日 2 (日本語会話第 2 組)

まり : 夜遅いでしょう、でもあれ。 /

うん、

えみ : そう一番… / なんか最後の方だもんね、あれ

< A 6 : フィラー等 >

話し手の発話中の言い淀み、フィラーなどの他、「なんか」「ちょっと」「wiesz」「nie wiem」等、原義の性格が薄れて単純に語句と語句の間に入れてリズムを作ったり、次に話す言葉を見つけるまでの場つなぎとして使用される発話。

例) 資料日 5 (日本語会話第 5 組)

しおり : とかいう題名で / なんか☆ / なんか☆ / その待ち合わせで? / なんか
さえこ : ははは! / 何☆ /

< B 2 : 理解・納得表明 >

相手の話を理解している、納得したという意味表示の発話。

例) 資料ポ 7 (ポーランド語会話第 7 組)

Teresa : no /

Maria : nie chodzi nawet o to, o tę kasę i o tę pracę, że mam, / ale chodzi o to, że,

テレサ : うん

マリア : それはさ、お金がどうか仕事がどうか言ってるんじゃないくて / 言いたい

< B 3 : 共感・賛同表明 >

相手の意思・意見・感情表明に対して共感・賛同することを表明する発話。

例) 資料日 2 (日本語会話第 2 組)

まり : そうそうそうそうそうそう /

えみ : 毎日トレーニングしてるんだろうなと思うよね、なんかあの二の腕

< B 7 : 感情表明 >

相手の先行発話に喚起された強い感情を表明する発話で、興味・感心・驚き・喜び等を示す感嘆詞、笑いなどがある。

例) 資料ポ 3 (ポーランド語会話第 3 組)

Kinga : wszystko to razem wzięte / jest dla niego / jedną wielką głupotą wojsko,

Dorota : hyhyhyhyhy / hahaha /

キングア : 全部、彼にとっては一つの大きな「バカなこと」なんだよ。軍隊ってさ。

ドロタ : ひひひひひ ははは

< B 1 0 : 確認 >

相手の発話内容に関して、あるいは省略された情報に関して、聞き手が自分の理解が正しいかどうかを確認する発話。

例) 資料ボ 2 (ポーランド語会話第 2 組)

Basia: w ten czwartek zrobimy sesję. / Więc wysłałam... / Nie, ten,

Jola: mhm / Ten, co był teraz? /

バシヤ : この木曜日に集会するのよ。 / だから送ったんだけど… / 違う、違う、今度の
ヨラ : うん / このあいだの? /

以上のように、主ターン発話（以下 A 発話と呼ぶ）、副ターン発話（以下 B 発話と呼ぶ）それぞれ 17 の発話機能を設定し、抽出した全 11, 739 発話をまず機能別に分類、コード化し、発話数と割合を調査した。続く第 2 項では、日本語会話とポーランド語会話での A 発話と B 発話の発話数の比較分析結果について述べる。

2. 分析結果

日本語会話に関する多くの先行研究で、英語、米語、中国語、韓国語等の言語と比較し、日本人はあいづちを多用するという傾向が明らかになってきているが、筆者の対ポーランド語比較検証においても、その定説は立証された。筆者が分析した、日本語、ポーランド語各会話の話者別の A 発話、B 発話総数の割合結果を示したものが **表 2-1, 2** である。

縦軸の①は、一人の話者の総発話数に占める A 発話と B 発話の割合、②は二者を総計して算出した、各組の総発話数に占める A 発話と B 発話の割合、③は 7 組全てを総計して算出した A 発話と B 発話の割合を示している。

両言語ともに、①には話者間で幅が見られるが、これは話題の展開の仕方により当然予測される差である。仮に二者間の 1 分間の会話を抽出、分析すれば、おそらく話者どちらかに A 発話が集中する結果となる可能性が高い。筆者は、数多くの話者交替の繰り返しが集められ、二者どちらにおいても聞き手としての言語行動が観察できることを狙いとして比較的長い時間を設定し、更にそれを 7 組集め、総合的に観察することで、両言語での会話の平均的な傾向ができるだけ忠実に表出されるよう試みた。実際、組別に見た場合の②を見ると、日本語会話においてはどの組も A 発話が 60% 台で非常に似

通った割合を示し、ポーランド語会話においても、差があるものの全体的にはA発話が80%前後の近似した値を占めるという興味ある結果が出ており、これは両言語の平均的な会話像を描き出していると見てよいと思われる。

即ち、会話全体を概観した場合、日本語においては、聞き手が話し手へ理解・同意・共感や感動を示したり、話し手の発話を予測・完結させたりして共作する副次的なB発話が発話総数の3分の1以上を占めているのに対し、ポーランド語では日本語ほど聞き手からの言語的反応は現れていないことがわかる。

ちなみに、会話の総時間数をB発話数で単純に割ると、日本語会話では約3秒毎にB発話が見られ、一方、ポーランド語会話では約9.9秒毎にB発話があるという結果になる。無論、これにはB発話を誘発するPPU末の出現頻度も無関係とは言えない。第1項の例で見たように、ポーランド語話者の一発話はかなり長いからである。では、ポーランド語話者のB発話の少なさは純粋にPPU末の出現頻度に比例したものだろうかという疑問が発生する。そこで次に、話し手のA発話何回に対し、聞き手からB発話1回があるかを話者毎に調べて平均値を出すと、日本語会話では相手のA発話1.76回に対し、ポーランド語会話では4.97回に対し、B発話が1回返されているという結果になった。即ち、会話におけるB発話出現度の差は、対話者のPPU数もさることながら、それ以上に、いくつのPPUに対してB発話を発するかとの反応頻度の差が大きく関係していると言えるのである。

3. まとめ

以上の分析結果より、対ポーランド語母語話者との比較でも、日本語母語話者は、聞き手の言語的反応をかなり頻繁に返し、それが会話を構成する重要な要素になっていること、一方、ポーランド語母語話者の方は、実質的な内容を伴うA発話が8割以上と会話の大部分を占め、聞き手の言語的反応は少なく、会話の重要な構成要素にはなっていないことが分かった。

無論、筆者の研究資料は20代女性（被験者のほとんどが大学生）に限定したものであり、性別、年齢、職業等被験者の特性に加えて、会話の種類（日常会話、会議、討論、面接…）や場面（公的場面か私的場面か）、対話者との関係（上下関係の有無、親疎の程度、既知の関係か否か…）などの諸条件により、会話は多様な様相を見せ

るため、あくまでも本研究の分析結果は、日本語会話とポーランド語会話の比較研究の一つのケーススタディに過ぎない。しかしながら、ポーランド人が母語でどのような会話をしているかを日本語と比較して分析した研究自体がおそらく皆無に近い以上、拙稿が紹介する分析結果が、日本語を学習するポーランド語母語話者にとって自己の会話スタイルを内省するきっかけとなり、また、ポーランド人に日本語を教える教師の側にとっては、何に留意して会話教育を行えば良いかを熟考する材料となるのではないかと希望している。本稿では、聞き手の言語行動のうち、まずは言語的反応の頻度についてのみ紹介した。次回は、その種類について詳しく述べる予定である。

表2-1【日本語会話の発話機能別分類表】

	日1		日2		日3		日4		日5		日6		日7		合計	
	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y		
A	1. 注目要求	1			2		3		1					1	8	
	2. 談話表示	23	20	18	10	13	20	10	10	9	8	23	3	7	23	197
	3. 情報提供	179	137	111	88	74	210	153	118	100	100	152	100	46	218	1786
	4. 意見・感情表明	109	48	48	68	62	90	97	50	75	94	78	59	85	62	1025
	5. 共感・同意要求	36	29	78	26	42	4	37	62	75	22	57	33	16	22	539
	6. 情報要求	3	4	26	5	26	3	7	33	17		18	6	47	10	205
	7. 意見・感情表明要求	3	5	4		16		2	9	2		3	1	4	3	52
	8. 共同行為要求							6	1							7
	9. 単独行為要求	1	6						3			4			1	15
	10. 確認	4	1	9	7	13	9	3	7	4	4	3	4	14	6	88
	11. フィラー等	25	10	22	14	22	28	12	20	18	20	21	14	13	20	259
	12. リズム応答	6	8	22	7	12	11	2	7	9	13	14	17	3	5	136
	13. 自己内発話	4	1	5	21	11	4	9	13	12	10	6	2	11	9	118
	14. 強い感情表明	8	2	10	4		3	8	9	1		6	3	4	4	62
	15. 言い直し要求															0
	16. 言い直し・訂正			4	1		2		2	1	1	2		1	1	15
	17. 未完結発話	3	4	3	5	2	15	6	1	4	2	3	1	4	4	57
	A小計	405	275	360	256	295	399	355	345	328	274	390	243	255	389	4569
	①	68%	53%	71%	55%	53%	70%	74%	56%	65%	57%	73%	48%	50%	82%	
	②	60,93%		63,11%		61,69%		63,93%		60,99%		60,69%		65,58%		
	③															62,38%

B	1. 促し	5	7	6	11	31	10	4	16		4		8	3	1	106
	2. 理解・納得表明	83	85	40	77	126	67	36	64	57	94	43	138	153	29	1092
	3. 共感・賛同表明	22	63	36	59	13	28	32	80	60	53	40	48	23	32	589
	4. 非共感等表明						1									1
	5. 情報提供等		3	19	13	1	14	14	6	3	12	4	2	2	2	95
	6. 立場不確定な発話	1		1	2		1			1	2	1			2	11
	7. 感情表明	43	70	15	22	30	30	15	54	28	18	35	61	28	8	457
	8. 感想表明	20	3	1	4	16	1	8	17	2	3	3	3	8	2	91
	9. うち消し				1	2	1			2			2			8
	10. 確認	11	5	15	15	28	3	6	11	8	2	14	1	17	3	139
	11. くり返し					1	1	4	5	1	1					13
	12. フィラー等			2	2	1					1			1	1	8
	13. 言い換え・総括	3	1			4	2	1	4	5	4			6	1	31
	14. 先取り	1	1	1		7	4		5	3	12		1	2	1	38
	15. 訂正						1				1					2
	16. 自己内発話	6	2	1	2	1	1	2	3	2		5	1	4	4	34
	17. 間もたせ発話		1	10	5	3	2	1	7	5	1			4	1	40
B小計	195	241	147	213	264	167	123	272	177	208	145	265	251	87	2755	
①	33%	47%	29%	45%	47%	30%	26%	44%	35%	43%	27%	52%	50%	18%		
②	39,07%		36,89%		38,31%		36,07%		39,01%		39,31%		34,42%			
③																37,62%
合計(A+B)	600	516	507	469	559	566	478	617	505	482	535	508	506	476	7324	

表2-2【ポーランド語会話の発話機能別分類表】

	ポ1		ポ2		ポ3		ポ4		ポ5		ポ6		ポ7		合計	
	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y		
A	1. 注目要求			4	1	2			3	1	1	4	1	3	4	24
	2. 談話表示	19	14	11	16	17	3	5	10	7	20	9	8	7	27	173
	3. 情報提供	56	94	175	98	206	39	85	139	58	157	94	41	41	15	1298
	4. 意見・感情表明	97	112	61	66	123	44	59	97	88	90	100	83	178	167	1365
	5. 共感・同意要求	10	12	7	27	6	2	1	7	5	7	16	5	2	29	136
	6. 情報要求	5	7	1	6	6	4	7	1	25	2	8	13	1	1	87
	7. 意見・感情表明要求	17	2	1	1	2	2	1		6	4		2	4	2	44
	8. 共同行為要求					2		1	2	6	6					17
	9. 単独行為要求		1	2				2	1	2	1	1		10	1	21
	10. 確認	2	3		2	2	1	5	1	19	4	1	5	13		58
	11. フィラー等	9	7	3	16	18	9	4	14	11	15	7	10	2	21	146
	12. リズム応答			10	1	2				1	1	2				17
	13. 自己内発話	1		4	3	6	1	4	1	5	3			2		30
	14. 強い感情表明	1	3	1	4			2	7	2	2	5	2	4	2	35
	15. 言い直し要求				1			1								2
	16. 言い直し・訂正			2	1				1	1				2		7
	17. 未完結発話	5	3	8	4	1	1	5	5	2	7	9	13	3	42	108
	A小計	222	258	290	247	393	106	182	289	239	320	256	183	272	311	3568
	①	76%	87%	86%	72%	96%	77%	72%	87%	67%	84%	87%	66%	80%	86%	
	②	81,36 %		78,74 %		91,56 %		80,38 %		75,75 %		76,61 %		83,17 %		
	③															80,82%

B	1. 促し															0
	2. 理解・納得表明	42	17	9	54	4	7	37	5	70	16	13	38	34	13	359
	3. 共感・賛同表明	17	19	3	8	7	4	14	10	4	19	16	28	10	15	174
	4. 非共感等表明			3				1		1				2	4	11
	5. 情報提供等			2	4		1	1	4	3	7				3	25
	6. 立場不確定な発話			1				1		1					1	4
	7. 感情表明	10	2	25	20	2	9	10	19	12	16	5	21	10	8	169
	8. 感想表明			1	6			3	2	8			1	1	2	24
	9. うち消し															0
	10. 確認		1	1	2		2	2	2	6	1	3	2	4		26
	11. くり返し	1								2			2			5
	12. フィラー等										1					1
	13. 言い換え・総括				3		1		3			1	3	1	2	14
	14. 先取り	1		2	1		6	2		4	1		1	7	1	26
	15. 訂正									2						2
	16. 自己内発話									1						1
	17. 間もたせ発話						2			2	2					6
	B小計	71	39	47	98	15	31	70	45	116	63	38	96	69	49	847
	①	24%	13%	14%	28%	4%	23%	28%	13%	33%	16%	13%	34%	20%	14%	
	②	18,64 %		21,26 %		8,44%		19,62 %		24,25 %		23,39 %		16,83 %		
	③															19,18%
	合計(A+B)	293	297	337	345	408	137	252	334	355	383	294	279	341	360	4415

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Beata Bochorodycz

**Policy Initiatives in Japanese Local Administration:
Initiation of the Okinawa Prefecture's Cosmopolitan City Formation
Concept**

This study attempts to illuminate the policy process of the Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept (CCFC; *Kokusai toshi keisei kōsō*), a set of long-term socio-economic policies that the local government of the Okinawa prefecture created entirely on its own initiative and submitted to the central government between January 1996 and November 1997. To illuminate the CCFC policy process, which analysis has been neglected so far, this study seeks answers two questions, first, the conditions enabling independent local policy making, and second, factors accounting for setting the first part of the CCFC, the Base Return Action Program (BRAP; *Kichi henkan akushon puroguramu*) on the national government's decision agenda.

Using the revised model of the multiple streams proposed by John Kingdon, I argue that the CCFC was brought about by a consecutive coupling of three streams of politics, problems and policy, first on the local level, and then on the national level.

In sum, the analysis demonstrates that the conditions enabling locally-initiated policy on the local level and its further setting on the national decision agenda include: (1) a double coupling of streams of politics, problems and policy on both the local and national levels, due to the highly centralized system of local policy making in Japan, under which the execution of the locally-initiated policies depend on financial, legal and administrative support of the central government; (2) possession of “a bargaining card” by the local government which can be used vis-à-vis the central government to induce response to local demands; and (3) simultaneous interplay of all three factors in the streams of politics, problems and policy, attended in addition by political entrepreneurs both local and national respectively willing to push with a policy initiative.

The study concludes by stating that the CCFC presents a model case of an independent local policy making, and might be regarded as one of the first harbinger of unbounding initiative in local policy making.

Mariusz K. Krawczyk

A tale of Two Monies.

Open Standard Versus Competing Standards in Electronic Money Payment Systems in Japan and Germany

The business model developed in the post-war Japanese economy predicts creating a number of closed to outsiders business groups that compete with each other. One of the consequences of the business model is the Japanese companies tendency to adopt a competing standard approach when searching for optimal solutions to technological or economic problems. Competition between Sony and JVC in the area of the video format may be one example of this process. Not surprisingly, the Japanese have opted for a similar approach when developing their electronic money payment systems. However, although the competing standard approach may work efficiently in choosing the best technology it does not seem to perform well if applied to electronic money market. It happens because it fails to capture the positive effects of network character of the electronic money. Money (including electronic money) is a typical network commodity and as such it has a very strong positive network externality. That means, the more widely used the commodity is the greater are the benefits its users acquire. The Japanese electronic money schemes have been developed and maintained by single issuing companies and, as such, once the issuing firm reaches its optimal size the entire scheme loses its incentives for expansion despite of the fact that it would benefit its customers if it expanded further. Let aside the country-specific factors behind the cash preference in Japan it is a main reason why the electronic money schemes perform much less satisfactory than it could be expected otherwise.

The European business model is based on open standard approach and many competing firms that operate within the standard rather than closed competing standards as it happens in Japan. This may be attributed either to the business tradition of European firms or to standardisation efforts undertaken by the European Union or both. The Germany's electronic money payment system seems to confirm that, although unable to replace conventional money altogether, the electronic money payment system based on the open standard approach can successfully find a market niche for small payments and can compete with some conventional money payment systems such as credit cards. It has been possible because Germany's open standard of electronic money fully utilises the positive

network externality of money. German and European authorities provided also sound legislative framework allowing for efficient regulation and expanding of the system. Without such an intervention of central authorities, creating an efficient and sound electronic money system in Japan may prove to be very difficult.

Kyoko Nakanishi

Contrastive Analysis of Hearer's Behavior in Japanese and Polish Conversation

The studies on Japanese language reveal that in Japanese dialogue the role of a hearer is very important for smooth progress of the conversation. Hence, it is important to adjust the guidance in teaching Japanese conversation not only to the speaker but also to the hearer's skills. In this paper I present a comparative analysis of the differences between the conversations of native speakers of Japanese and Polish using the natural speech data.

地方自治体の政策イニシアティブ ——沖縄県の「国際都市形成構想」を中心に——

本稿の目的は、沖縄県が大田昌秀県知事の就任中（1999-1998年）、県として始めて自発的に策定した長期的総合な計画である「国際都市形成構想（CCFC）」の政策過程を明らかにすることである。今まで学術的な分析が欠如した「国際都市形成構想」の政策過程を解明するには、本稿は具体的に二つの問いに対して答えを提供している。第一に、自治体はどのような条件で独自に政策策定に取り組んだのか、そして、第二に、どのような条件で中央政府の決定アジェンダに独自の政策（「国際都市形成構想」の第一部である「基地返還アクションプログラム（BRAP）」）を設定できたのか。

この問いを答えるためには、本稿はJ.キングダンの修正した「政策の窓」モデルを適用して、以下のように論じている。自治体が独自の政策を策定する条件としては、地方レベルで（1-loc.）政治の流れにおいて新しい県幹部の「イデオロギー」であり、（2-loc.）問題の流れにおいて県経済の自立的な発展のための基地返還の必要性であり、そして（3-loc.）政策の流れにおいて新しい県政下で策定した「国際都市形成構想」関連の諸政策案、といった三つのファクターの合流であった。

第二に、国レベルで沖縄県独自の政策を中央政府の決定アジェンダに設定させたファクターとしては、（1-nat.）政治の流れにおいて1995年9月の少女暴行事件のきっかけに広がった反基地ムードや連立政権をリードした社会民主党のイデオロギーであり、（2-nat.）問題の流れにおいて大田知事の代理署名拒否（「バーゲン・カード」）であり、（3-nat.）政策の流れにおいて県が策定した「国際都市形成構想」といったファクターが挙げられる。それに加えて、国レベルにはローカルの政策を推進しようとした「政治事業家」、つまり村山富市総理大臣の存在であった。

なお、本稿は、地方レベルにおける独自の政策策定とその政策の中央政府の決定アジェンダに設定するために次の条件が必要であると総合的に論じている。第一に、三つの流れ（政治・問題・政策）の

合流は、地方と中央、二つのレベルにそれぞれ発生する必要がある。なぜならば、自治体の独自政策の実現は、中央政府の財政的、法的、行政の支援に頼っているからである。第二に、地方地自体は、独自の政策を中央政府に実現させるために「バーゲン・カード」を所有する必要がある。第三に、三つの流れの合流は同時に行うのに加えて、政策を推進しようとする地方と中央それぞれの「政策事業家」の存在が不可欠である。

最後に、本稿は、「国際都市形成構想」を政策イニシアティブにおける地方自治体の自立化への先駆的な試みとして位置づけるとともに、他の日本の自治体にとって同構想は政策イニシアティブの原型モデルになる可能性を指摘している。

マリウシュ・K・クラフチック

二貨幣物語

一日本およびドイツ経済における電子マネーのパフォーマンス

戦後日本のビジネスモデルの下で部外者を閉め出した多くの競争するビジネスグループが創られた。そのビジネスモデルの結果の一つとして、日本の企業が技術的もしくは経済的問題の最適な解決策を模索する際に、**competing standard** (競争的スタンダード)アプローチを採用する傾向があることが挙げられる。ビデオフォーマットの分野におけるソニーとJVCの競争は、このプロセスの一つの例になるであり、日本では電子マネー支払システムが発展させるときに、これとよく似たアプローチを選択することは驚くことではない。しかし、**competing standard** アプローチは、最高の技術を選択することにおいては効果的であるかもしれないが、電子マネー市場に適用して十分に機能するようには思えない。なぜなら、このアプローチは電子マネーのネットワークキャラクターの積極的効果を利用できないかもしれないからである。電子マネーを含む貨幣は典型的なネットワーク商品であり、それ自体が非常に強力な **positive network externality** (積極的ネットワークの外部効果) を有する。これは、その商品が広範に利用されればされるほど利用者の利益が増大することを意味する。しかし、日本の電子マネースキームは各電子マネーを発行する会社によって発展・維持されており、そのためにそれ

ぞれ発行会社が最適規模に達すると、さらなる拡大が顧客の利益になるという事実にもかかわらず、スキーム全体が拡大の刺激を失うことになる。日本においては現金嗜好が強いという特有の要素はさておき、これが日本において電子マネースキームが期待されたほど十分に機能しない主な理由である。

ヨーロッパのビジネスモデルは、日本のモデルと異なり、オープンスタンダードの中で多くの競争する企業に基づいている。これは、ヨーロッパの企業のビジネス伝統、もしくはEUによって実施された標準化のための努力、またはその両方によるものかもしれない。オープンスタンダードに基づく電子マネー支払システムは従来のマネーに完全に取って代わることはできないものの、小額支払に最適の市場をうまく見つけ、クレジットカードやデビットカードのような従来のいくつかの支払システムと競争することができるということを、ドイツの電子マネー支払システムは裏付けているように思える。これは、ドイツの電子マネーのオープンスタンダードが貨幣の **positive network externality** を完全に利用しているからで可能であったのである。ドイツおよびEU当局は、効率的な規制と制度の拡大を考慮に入れて、信用できる法的枠組みを定めた。そのような中央当局の介入なしに、日本において効率的で信頼できる電子マネーシステムを創ることは、非常に難しいことがわかる。

中西恭子

聞き手の言語行動に関する日本語会話とポーランド語会話の比較分析

従来の日本語研究の成果により、日本語会話においては、聞き手の役割が円滑な談話進行に大きな役割を果たしていることが明らかになっている。そこで、日本語の会話教育では、話し手の技術のみでなく、聞き手の技術の適した指導も重要になる。本稿は、日本語母語話者の会話とポーランド語母語話者の会話では、聞き手の言語行動がどのように違うかを、自然談話資料を基に比較分析した。

AUTORZY / CONTRIBUTORS / 投稿者

Beata Bochorodycz

A lecturer at the Oriental Institute, Adam Mickiewicz University (AMU) in Poznan, specializing in Japanese politics. After obtaining her M.A. in Japanese literature at the Chair of Oriental Studies, Department of Japanese Studies, AMU (1993), she became a research fellow at the Tokyo International Christian University (1993-1994) and Kyushu University (1994-1996) in Fukuoka. She also received her M.A. in law at the Law Department of Kyushu University, specializing in Japanese politics (2001), where she finalized a doctor course (1998-2001) and worked as an assistant (2001-2003). She submitted her PhD dissertation in the Institute of Political Studies and Journalism at AMU (2006), concerning local autonomy in policy making. She was also a fellow of the International Rotary Club (1993-1995) and the Japanese Ministry of Education (1997-2001). Her research focuses on the decision making process in the Japanese public administration and the Okinawa issue.

Mariusz K. Krawczyk

Professor of European Economics at Ryukoku University in Kyoto, Japan. He received his PhD from Kobe University and his teaching experience includes also lectures in international finance and comparative economics at Fukuoka University, theory of European integration at Kobe University, and theory of money at Kyushu Sangyo University. His research interests focus on European and Japanese financial markets. He is the author of 『東欧の市場経済化』 (Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe) (九州大学出版会 1999) and 「ユーロへの困難な道」 (A Hard Road to the Euro) (『世界経済評論』第48巻 第6号). He is also co-author of 『ユーロとEUの金融システム』 (The Euro and the International Financial System) (日本経済評論社 2003) and *Institutional and Technological Change in Japan's Economy: Past and Present* (Routledge, 2006).

Kyoko Nakanishi

A lecturer of Japanese at the Japanology Department, Oriental Institute, Adam Mickiewicz University (AMU). She was sent to Poland as a volunteer by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). After three

years of working for JICA, she received the present position at UAM. She is in charge of classes of Japanese conversation, mainly for beginners. She obtained her M.A. at the Japanology Department, AMU in 2004, presenting a comparative study of Japanese and Polish conversations as her master's thesis. Her specialty is Japanese-Language Education and Japanese-Language Studies. Currently her interests focus on Conversation Analysis and Teaching Conversation Skills.

ベアタ・ボホロディチ

1968年生。政治学・日本の政治専攻。現在、アダム・ミツキエヴィッチ大学東洋学研究所日本学科講師。経歴：1993年、アダム・ミツキエヴィッチ大学新文献学部・修士号取得（日本文学専攻）。1993-1994年、東京国際基督教大学教養学部語学科・研究生。1994-1996年、九州大学法学部・研究生。1998年、九州大学大学院法学研究科・修士号取得（法学）。2001年、同、博士後期課程終了。2001-2003年、九州大学大学院法学研究院・助手。1993-1995年、国際財団ロータリークラブ・フェロー；1997-2001年、日本政府文部省・奨学生。2006年、アダム・ミツキエヴィッチ大学政治学・ジャーナリズム研究所・博士号取得・政治学専攻（予定）。研究分野：日本の政策過程・沖縄問題。

マリウシュ・K・クラフチック

龍谷大学経済学部教授（ヨーロッパ経済論担当）。経済学博士（神戸大学大学院経済学研究科終了）。職歴：福岡大学（国際金融論、比較経済論）、九州産業大学（金融論）、神戸大学（欧州統合論）。研究テーマ：ヨーロッパおよび日本の金融システム。主な研究業績：『東欧の市場経済化』、九州大学出版会1999年（単著）、「ユーロへの困難な道」、『世界経済評論』第48巻 第6号（単著）、『ユーロとEUの金融システム』、日本経済評論社2003年（共著）、*Institutional and Technological Change in Japan's Economy: Past and Present* (Routledge, 2006)（共著）他。

中西恭子

アダム・ミツキエヴィッチ大学東洋学研究所日本学専攻日本語講師。日本国際協力機構の青年海外協力隊事業により本校に派遣され、3年間の勤務の後、常勤講師として就職、現在は主に初級者を対象に日本語演習の授業を担当している。2004年、日本語会話とポーランド語会話の比較研究を修士論文として提出し、本校日本研究科修士課程を卒業。日本語教育学、日本語学専攻。主たる研究分野は会話分析、会話教育である。

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Silva Iaponicarum
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza
Instytut Orientalistyczny
ul. Międzychodzka 5
60-371 Poznań, Poland
E-mail: silvajp@amu.edu.pl